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1. Introduction - Problem Area 
Coffee is mainly produced in the south but consumed in the north or in other words, 
produced in developing countries and consumed in developed countries. At the same time, coffee 
is mainly produced by smallholders (in the south), whereas a few big corporations (in the north) 
dominate the roasting and selling business. Additionally, there are many developing countries 
which earn great amounts of their foreign export earnings by exporting green coffee beans while 
the smallholders that produce the vast majority of the green coffee have often less than 7 hectares 
in total for farming. Therefore, analyzing the coffee market can give clues about how actors in 
the coffee sector can help to reduce poverty in developing countries. As there are many different 
actors with different approaches and strategies, this project tries to help to identify differences 
and similarities between a public, a private and a public-private partnership (PPP). 
 
It is unclear when nations started trading coffee, but it has been discussed by different 
scholars that coffee drinking originates from the Islamic world. Originating from Ethiopia and 
introduced by the Arab society to the rest of the world, coffee became more and more desired 
and therefore a powerful commodity (Holmes 2008: 15). As coffee changed from an elite drink 
for upper classes, coffee consumption increased significantly after it had become also widely 
popular among the working-class. There were more and more plantations, which lead to 
overproduction, which in turn brought coffee prices down. Leading to the establishment of the 
International Coffee Agreement (ICA) between most consuming and producing countries in 
1962, under which “a target price (or price band) for coffee was set, and export quotas were 
allocated to each producer” (Daviron and Ponte 2005: 87). 
 
“The coffee industry claimed that the quota allocation among countries did not 
make available the coffee they needed (…). Consequently, in 1989, a number of 
countries withdrew from the program and it collapsed.” (Sarris and Hallam 
2006: 285) 
 
Though the coffee producing countries tried to influence the coffee prices, other 
dominant players entered the stage. In the global value chain of coffee production four global 
corporations (Neumann, Volcafé, ECOM and Dreyfus) and three roasters (Philip Morris, Nestlé 
and Sara Lee) dominate the coffee market. The four biggest companies trade about 40 per cent of 
the global coffee and the three roasters roast about 45 per cent of world-wide coffee. This gives 
them not only a strong negotiation and trading power, but at the same time in terms of value 
adding, these transnational corporations capture most value in coffee chain; by far more than any 
coffee producer. (Hutchens 2009: 35ff) 
 
 Leading to the situation of how coffee is traded up to date; the green coffee beans 
are traded in stock markets. For Arabica beans the main stock market is located in New York and 
the international trading floor for Robusta is in London. Here prices are set globally, directly 
linked to the prices paid to coffee producers. The same situation as described for the price setting 
8 
(in the north), can be allocated for the addition of value though roasting, grinding, blending, 
packaging and marketing (in the north as well). 
 
Nicholls and Opal (2005) write that in the conventional trading structure, farmers add 7% 
value, the retailers 33% and the roasters up to 45%. Of course, in the end, this also leads to the 
price different actors get out of their work (Nicholls and Opal 2005: 83). Here one can see, that 
of the coffee bought though the conventional trade, the farmer adds almost no value and 
therefore receives almost no payment in return. 
 
Leading to the approach, that with the changing of the global coffee value chain the 
farmers percentage of value added can rise and therefore farmers and/or the coffee sector in the 
producing country can earn more money while adding more value to the final product. As a main 
aim of this approach there will not only be more money made in the producing country, but as 
most coffee farmers are smallholders, this will have a positive impact on reducing poverty in 
coffee producing countries. 
 
 In this project three cases in three different countries, Uganda, Rwanda and 
Ethiopia, are looked at. Even though these three countries have many differences, they also share 
similarities; they are all sub-saharan countries and all are landlocked; furthermore they share the 
dependence (or at least have shared) on the coffee sector for export earnings; they are all 
considered Least Developed Countries (LCDs) by the UN. This project will compare three 
alternative support strategies in these three countries that are or were dependent on coffee export 
earnings. The three cases are a public association, a private company and a public-private 
partnership. The first case is the Uganda Coffee Development Authority (UCDA); the second 
case, a partnership between USAID and private companies in Rwanda; and the third case is 
Solino, a private company in Ethiopia. All three cases have as an aim to support the coffee sector 
in the country they are acting in. Nevertheless, they are pursuing these goals in different ways. 
Therefore the research question of this project is: 
 
What are the differences and similarities in the presented cases and in 
which way do they support the coffee sector? 
 
By answering the research question the project wants to show different approaches of 
support to the coffee sector, depending on the modes of practice and their impacts. By pointing 
out similarities in the approach and showing differences the projects answers the research 
question. 
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2. Methodology  
 In this chapter, the methodology used to find answers to the research question proposed 
will be explained. The basis and focus of the project is a comparative case study, that is built on 
three different cases. 
2.1. Comparative case study 
The main focus of this project of the different ways of support in the coffee sector lies in 
a comparative case study which includes three cases: the Uganda Coffee Development Authority 
(UCDA) in Uganda; USAID and corporation as public-private partnerships (PPP) in Rwanda; 
and the private company Solino from Germany as an actor in the Ethiopian coffee market. 
Similarities and differences will be analysed in the comparison and are especially interesting in 
regard to the research question.  
 
A comparative-case study was chosen to provide answers to the research question for two 
reasons. First, a comparison of the cases is selected because only with the comparison of 
different cases can the variety of support to the coffee sector be adequately analyzed. Secondly, 
only a comparative-case study can help find answers to the second part of the question which is 
comparative in nature; what different methods exist that provide support to coffee sector. 
 
In lack of time and resources the authors were not able to travel to all three different 
countries. Instead of primary data collection, secondary data collection was mostly relied on in 
order to analyze the three presented cases. For UCDA and USAID especially secondary literature 
review has been used in addition to publications by the institutions themselves. Furthermore, 
statistics were searched to back up the findings. One interview was conducted with the CEO of 
Solino in Germany. Here it was especially needed, due to the fact that some academic literature 
of Solino has been published that can contrast the data that was found for UCDA and USAID for 
which academic literature has already been written. Therefore the interview was conducted to 
gather the remaining necessary data on the company.  
 
For the interview, the CEO was chosen by the authors as the person with the greatest 
knowledge of the company, and thus most capable of providing the relevant data. Additionally 
the CEO also founded the company and therefore has the best knowledge on the performance of 
the company and the history of this specific firm as well. 
 
2.1.1. Primary literature 
Though secondary research was more heavily relied on, research was necessary and used 
accordingly. Since one of our cases was such a specific case that looked into a particular 
company, it was necessary to visit the company and gather the data first-hand. Otherwise, no 
such data exists in academic literature on this small company (Solino) that could be used for the 
project and the research question that is intended on being answered. However, Solino’s 
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webpage provided some, but not all, of the information that was needed to conduct a full analysis 
not all. Therefore a semi-structured interview was necessary and consequently conducted with 
the CEO of Solino in which the remaining data was gathered for the intent and purpose of the 
project and for answering the research question. 
2.1.2. Interview 
According to the main research question, different topics of interest were focused on. 
Through these fields of interest answers to the research question were looked for. Divided up 
into these topics, questions for the interview were thought of before the web page analysis took 
place. Added with the information found on the web page the interview was conducted. This was 
done to not bias the interview through the information gathered online. However, questions 
asked also relied on the information available through the internet. 
 
The interview took place the 29th of April 2014. The interview partner was the CEO of 
Solino. The interview was recorded to allow the researchers to fully concentrate on the interview. 
Later the recordings were transcribed and can be consulted in the appendix of the project. The 
interview was held in German, due to the fact that the mother tongue of the interviewee and the 
interviewer are German. The interview was transcribed in the original language, but the direct 
quotes in the project are translated to English.  
2.1.2.1 Style of interview 
As a style of interview, the form of a semi-structured interview was chosen as written 
above. In the interview all thought of questions were asked, though if something was left unclear, 
the interviewer was able to inquire. Also the semi-structured interview left enough space for all 
differences and nuances of characteristics of the company’s CEO to answer to.The settings of the 
interview can be read in the beginning of the transcribed interview in the appendix. Here a short 
briefing of the surroundings, the atmosphere and the setting of the interview are pointed out as 
well. 
2.1.3. Text analysis of web pages 
A first sight will be taken via an analysis of the web pages of the organisations. 
Information about the cases will be gathered and collected. The web pages serve as a public 
representation in the internet for different actors. Therefore the homepages of each case can be 
analysed as an open access representation of each institution. 
2.1.4. Secondary articles 
To have a good overview on the topic of actors on the coffee market available, academic 
articles, self-published articles, and raw data were gathered for the different cases for which such 
data was available (i.e. the Ugandan and the Rwandan cases). Secondary data was gathered using 
internet searches and through physical books and articles. Especially for the public and public-
private partnership (PPP) cases, it is very interesting to have another view on the topic by a third 
party, because here the actors are public, meaning, they are responsible for being transparent. 
Articles by third parties could be found with more ease with regards to the two more public cases 
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(i.e. Rwanda and Uganda). As the company in the Ethiopian case is private and quite small, 
almost no article, apart from newspaper articles and food blogs, have been published on this 
case.  
 
Thus secondary articles were mostly relied on to gather the necessary data and provid a 
good and more diverse overview of the cases. Additionally, the academic articles used gave a 
brief insight view of the latest up-to-date research on the coffee sector. 
3. Theory 
This section of the project focuses on the main terms used by the authors throughout the 
whole project to support the analysis of each case. Therefore no specific theory will be used to 
support the comparative case study, but main terms which are used in the literature and this 
project will be explained and outlined.  
 
First, the term poverty will be briefly explained and different definitions will be pointed 
out, showing what is understood in this project understands when using the term poverty. 
Second, literature about public-private-partnership is reviewed, analyzed and put into context for 
this project. Third, the term ‘value chain’ is looked at and explained. 
3.1. POVERTY 
 First of all, the two main concepts of absolute and relative poverty are explained. Second, 
a brief overview of the main concepts of poverty are given. Thirdly, the measurement used in 
this project, the headcount ratio, is explained. As poverty alleviation is one of the main aims of 
all three cases, this outline is helpful to understand the analysis of this project.  
 
Absolute poverty and relative poverty 
Definitions of absolute poverty vary to great extent from organisation to organisation, for 
example, some include social needs while others do not. The Copenhagen Declaration of the 
World Summit for Social Development, signed by the governments of 117 countries, states that 
“absolute poverty is a condition characterized by severe deprivation of basic human needs, 
including food, safe drinking water, sanitation facilities, health, shelter, education and 
information” (UN 1995: Chapter 2).  
 
 Whereas the absolute poverty has a common ground from the UN, relative poverty differs 
from case to case. Making it, as the name already says, relative to where one lives. Roach and 
Roach (1972) define it as “the bottom segment of income distribution” (Roach and Roach 1972: 
p.23). As one can see, relative poverty depends on the wealth of a country and leading to 
different poverty lines from country to country.   
 
Understanding poverty 
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There are many different ways to analyze and define poverty. The graph below shows the 
12 main concepts of how one can understand poverty (Spickler, 2007: p.2ff). In the top row the 
cluster of the different definitions can be found: 1) poverty as  material concepts; 2) poverty as 
economic circumstances; 3) social circumstances; and 4) poverty as moral judgment. Below in 
the columns the different approaches are displayed.  
 
The twelve main concepts of poverty 
Poverty as material 
concept 
Poverty as economic 
circumstances 
Social circumstances Poverty as moral 
judgement 
(1) Need (4) Standard of living (7) Social class (12) Unacceptable 
hardship 
(2) A pattern of 
deprivation 
(5) Inequality (8) Dependency  
(3) Limited resources (6) Economic 
position 
(9) Lack of basic 
security 
 
  (10) Lack of 
entitlement 
 
  (11) Exclusion  
Table 1: The twelve main concepts of poverty (by authors; following Spicker 2007) 
 
The graph displays the main concepts of how to understand poverty. Out of the different 
perspectives on poverty, different measures have to be made to be able to analyze poverty 
according to each approach. This project mainly falls under the poverty as economic 
circumstances cluster. The main indicator used in the project will be the so-called poverty 
headcount index, which will be explained into further detail below. The headcount index is 
located in the economic group as one that measures inequality, due to the fact that it displays the 
amount of people living below a country’s poverty line.  
 
How are poverty lines established? 
 One of the most common ways of establishing the (local and national) poverty line is by 
calculating the cost of basic needs. First, the food poverty line is established by putting together 
‘typical’ food consumed by the poor. The amount of food is predetermined by the minim caloric 
level of the UN (2200 kilocalorie). The price for the selected food is calculated and added by the 
costs of non-food articles (MoFED 2012: p.4). 
 
 
What are the most common indicators? 
 As one can see, there are many different ways of how to analyze poverty. Keeping this in 
mind, there are many different ways of measuring poverty as well, depending on where the most 
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interest lies. The most widespread indicators are: headcount index, poverty gap index, and the 
poverty severity index. Headcount index measures the percentage of people that are not able to 
afford a basic basket of food and therefore fall under the poverty line. The poverty gap shows the 
distance people under the poverty line have to reach the poverty line, estimating the resources it 
would take to bring all poor people to the poverty line. The last indicator, the poverty severity 
index, not only accounts for the distance to the poverty line, but also weighs those that are placed 
further away from the poverty line (MoFED 2012: p.4f). 
 
To be able to show major trends in the poverty lines and poverty percentages in each of 
the cases, the headcount ratio has been chosen for this project. Here in all three cases, most of the 
data was available and accessible. Additionally, the headcount ratio has the national poverty line 
as a basis, accounting for differences between the three cases. The headcount ratio is also being 
used, because it is “the measurement of poverty most commonly used in the examining of 
poverty in the world in general” (Sen 2006: p.32).  
 
Nevertheless, we are aware that the measurement of poverty by the headcount ratio 
entails some limitations. For example it does not take the deprivation of the poor into account 
(Sen 2006: p. 42f). As this project does not only focus on poverty itself but the steps which are 
undertaken by actors to influence poverty, the headcount is taken as the best accessible and most 
useful poverty measurement, while being aware of its limitations. 
3.2. PUBLIC-PRIVATE-PARTNERSHIPs 
 Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) are a recent phenomena by developmental history 
standards. Established in the 1990’s, PPP’s offered new and innovative opportunities for 
implementing public policy (Osborne 2000: 1). PPP’s can mean different things in different 
contexts. Since this project deals with PPP’s because of USAID in one particular case (Rwanda) 
it will work the description of PPPs under the U.S. context (as ooposed to the European 
contexts). Osborne (2000) defines this contexts as such:  
 
“PPPs are central to national and state-government initiatives to regenerate 
local urban communities, as well as arising out of community-led attempts to 
deal with the crisis of government.” (Osborne 2000: 1) 
 
 Though this definition leaves out the rural population, the crux of the case which will be 
analyzed, further definitions will be given to explain the more specific context USAID will be 
working within Rwanda. Generally speaking however, there are many benefits to PPP’s 
mentioned in the literature, among them,  
 
“1) a means by which to combat social exclusion by integrating public and 
private components of local communities…, 2) the chance to reform local 
public services..., 3) the opportunity to develop cost efficient ways of 
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providing local services to meet social needs…, 4) more responsive and 
flexible public policy making, by utilizing the community and business links 
offered by PPPs in order to improve the quality of the policy making process, 
and 5) a route both to the reform of the political basis of government and to 
the creation and sustenance of civil society.” (Osborne 2000:  2) 
 
Of them, the most applicable to the case study in question regard the process and impact of 
PPP’s on local services and for the development of the local community. These can achieved by 
any number of partnerships not limited to any one in particular. Partnerships can include 
governments, businesses, voluntary and non-profit sector, and the local community (Osborne 
2000: 2). 
 
A key question proposed by Bilal et al., (2014) about the nature of these partnerships is 
“who leads whom, and how” (Bilal et al. 2014: vii). Looking at current partnerships, Bilal et al., 
(2014) identified two broad categories in which PPPs function: 1) private sector investment for 
development, and 2) private sector finance for development. As it stands, most partnerships fall 
under the first category, however there are increasing efforts in private financing for 
development. Looking at one or the other type of partnership (investment or finance), three 
different drivers can be identified behind the partnership: 1) The donor’s perspective, where 
public funds are used to promote and develop the private sector, 2) the private sector’s 
perspective, where the focus is on maximising development impact of already existing private 
sector activity, and 3) the policy and operational perspective, which relates to the institutional 
influence of private sector activity through appropriate structures and policies (Bilal et al. 2014: 
vii).  
 
Wherever public money is used, there is a requirement to prove the efficiency of that 
money and show that it is needed. This is no different in the case of PPPs where both publicly-
funded and privately-owned money is used. More so, public-private partnerships need to have 
clear goals and objectives in order to show its necessity. They also need to be in accordance with 
nationally planned strategies so as not to hinder one another. It is important that partners are 
aware of their role as facilitators rather than drivers, and share policy-processes, funding, 
failures, and successes ( Bilal et al. 2014: viii). 
 
By the beginning of the millennia, USAID recognized the need to reorganize their 
development assistance methods. Related to PPPs, in order to conceptualize and implement the 
ideas mentioned above, in May 2001 USAID introduced their Global Development Assistance 
(GDA) concept. USAID set their own terms for what constitutes as GDA, all in the best interest 
of the development objectives. For a partnership to be considered as GDA, it needs to be in 
accordance with the following criteria:  
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“ 1) At least a 1:1 leverage (cash and in-kind) of USAID resources, 2) 
Common goals for all partners, 3) Jointly-defined solution to a social or 
economic development problem, 4) Non-traditional resource partners 
(companies, foundations, etc.), 5) Shared resources, risks and results, and 6) 
Innovative, sustainable approaches to development.” (GDA 2014) 
 
The essence of GDA 
 
 
Figure 1: The essence of GDAs (GDA, 2014) 
 
The diagram above shows the basic idea behind GDAs; to combine input from the private 
sector and USAID’s development goals. However partnerships are not only limited to businesses 
but can be any number of foundations including international organizations, colleges, 
universities, civic groups, public figures, philanthropic leader, advocacy groups and more (GDA 
2014). GDAs look for market-based solutions to advance broader development goals. Partners 
are expected to have input in various forms including, implementation of new technologies, 
resources, ideas, and linkages to address development issues in the countries USAID is working 
in (Developing Partnerships, 2010). Though GDA require more stringent criteria to be regarded 
as such, USAID also works with other public-private partnerships that are less structured. Since 
none of the articles specified the nature of the alliances between USAID and their partners, the 
project will assume that PPPs were formed with requirements resembling those of GDAs but 
were not restricted to them.   
 
 
 
 
Public and Private Institutions 
 Since the project deals with public and private institutions individually, it is important to 
also give a definition of such institutions so it is clear what is being analyzed. The public sector 
consists of the part of the economy whose services are provided by the government. It can be 
defined as such:  
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“In general terms, the public sector consists of governments and all publicly 
controlled or publicly funded agencies, enterprises, and other entities that 
deliver public programs, goods, or service.” (IIA 2011: 3) 
 
The public sector, however, is not meant to be exclusively reserved for the government. It 
can also overlap with the non-profit or private sectors. At the center of the public sector lies the 
government. Around it there are also agencies and public enterprises which are included and are 
part of the public sector. Furthermore, the public sector may be divided into four levels: 1) 
International, 2) National, 3) Regional, and 4) Local (IIA 2011: 3) 
 
 Private institutions are made up of private citizens or groups, not under the direct control 
of government. However it does not act completely on its own free will. The private sector is still 
regulated by the government and must comply to the laws of the country (Haufler 2013: 3). 
3.3. GLOBAL VALUE CHAIN  
Throughout the project, the authors draw on the ideas of value chain analysis and 
especially on the ideas of global value chains. Understanding this concept will not only help to 
understand the project better, but is also used as the basis of the third case (Solino in Ethiopia). 
Additionally, the concept of value chains and value adding help the reader to understand the 
strategies of how the three presented cases want to achieve their goals. Therefore, the authors 
will also draw on this concept in their conclusion.  
 
First pointed out by Hopkins and Wallerstein (1986, 1994), as Gibbon and Ponte (2005) 
write, the Global Value Chain approach emerged in relation to the global commodity chain 
(GCC) analysis. The term became more widely used in the mid 1990’s and it “is used to discuss 
a variety of international chains for agricultural (and timber) products, from the beginning of the 
early modern era” (Gibbon and Ponte 2005: 74f). Hopkins and Wallerstein showed how different 
companies interact in commodity chains, whereas Gereffi and Korzeniwicz (1994) try to identify 
the different stages of value adding to a certain product. Around the 2000’s, the term commodity 
chain was replaced in the literature with value chain as it “is thought to better capture a wider 
variety of products, some of which lack commodity features” (Gibbon and Ponte 2005: 77). Here 
the importance lies on value adding and how much value is added along the chain from the 
producer to the final consumer. These different stages can be located in one single firm or within 
a set of firms. The commodities and services traded within the GVC represent value in two ways: 
(1) they are results of specific processes where value is added, and (2) they adapt a certain 
amount of quality (Gibbon and Ponte 2005: 85). GVC also helps to identify the location of value 
adding: the product can be produced in a single geographic region or across continents.  
 
The term chain is used to “focus on vertical relationships between buyers and suppliers 
and the movement of a good or service from producer to consumer” (Gibbon and Ponte 2005: 
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77). With a GVC analysis, different actors that all work on one end product can be analysed. 
Specifically, the theory is applied to products that are produced in different firms across a wider 
region, hence the word “global” in the term. Special attention is given to multinational 
enterprises or systems of governance that link firms (Gereffi et al. 2001: 1). 
 
Gereffi (1994) points out three major structures of global value chains: (1) the 
interlinkage of the value adding processes; (2) the organisational, spatial or territorial structure of 
firms involved and forming the production and marketing networks; and (3) ‘chain governance’ 
through which the allocation of resources along the chain is influenced (Gereffi 1994: 96f). 
 
As one can see, the GVC concepts draws heavily on the value single actors add to the 
final product. Leading to the conclusion, the more percentage, moneywise of the final product, is 
added by an actor, the more money the actros receives for the service provided. In relation to the 
project, these concepts can be found in every case, due to their aims and strategies of supporting 
the coffee sector. Therefore, the GVC needs to be taken into in account when looked at the cases 
of this project. 
4. Broad country descriptions 
This section will give a brief overview of the countries in which the cases are located. 
The order of the countries will follow the same order in case description. Uganda will be 
presented first, followed by Rwanda and finished by Ethiopia. This section will help to get an 
overlook of the different contexts of the chosen cases. To start, the map below will give an 
overview of the countries which will later provide depth to the issues and benefits given their 
location and space. 
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The location of Ethiopia, Uganda and Rwanda 
 
Figure 2: Location of Ethiopia, Uganda and Rwanda (Harvard Maps 2014) 
 
All three countries are located relatively close to each other. All of them are on the 
African continent, are sub-Saharan, and are located east on the African continent. While Uganda 
and Rwanda share borders, Kenya and South Sudan are between Uganda and Ethiopia. All of the 
countries are landlocked, which is crucial for the export of commodities, though Ethiopia has the 
shortest way to the sea. One can also quickly notice the differences in size, Ethiopia being by far 
the biggest of the three, followed by Uganda and Rwanda being the smallest in size.  
 
Country Comparison Uganda - Rwanda - Ethiopia 
 Size Population GDP per capita 
(IMF 2013)  
GDP ranking 
(of 183) 
HDI (of 
186) 
Uganda 241.000 km² 34.5 million 626 $US #169 #161 
Rwanda 26.000 km² 11.4 million 698 $US #164 #167 
Ethiopia 1.100.000 km² 88 million 541 $US #174 #172 
 Table 2: Country comparison (table by authors following Britannica,  IMF and UN) 
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In the table the differences in size, population, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, 
the GDP country ranking and the ranking according to the Human Development Index (HDI) can 
be observed. As one can see, there is great variation amongst the countries in terms of country 
size and population, with Ethiopia being by far the largest. However all three are quite similar in 
their GDP and HDI rankings, with only ten and eleven countries in between them, respectively. 
Ethiopia has the smallest GDP per capita and is also ranked lowest in the HDI ranking. Rwanda 
and Uganda are closest to each other in these two characteristics (GDP per capita and HDI 
ranking). Though some differences and similarities in the GDP and HDI ranking can be seen, all 
three countries are labeled as Least Developing Countries (LDCs), as well as being part of the 
list of LLDC’s (Landlocked Least Developed Countries); all three countries have been on the list 
of LDC’s since 1971 (UN 2014).  
5. CASE I : Uganda Coffee Development Authority 
The first case that will be described is the case of the Uganda Coffee Development 
Authority (UCDA). This institution is fully publicly funded and located directly under the 
ministry of agriculture. To have a good overview and idea about this institution the history of the 
Ugandan coffee sector is described, followed by a description of the modes of practice by 
UCDA; the chapter is closed by a description and analysis of the impact of UCDA.  
5.1. History 
In this section the history of the Ugandan Coffee market will be analyzed. Additionally, 
insights in the institutional history of the Uganda Coffee Development Authority (UCDA) will 
be given. Therefore firstly, an overall view of Ugandan coffee and the coffee sector will be given 
and later details of the UCDA will be focused on. 
5.1.1 History of the particular coffee market 
The history of the coffee market in Uganda for this project can be broadly divided into 
three sections: 1) principal facts about the coffee in Uganda in broader terms; 2) a more detailed 
perspective on the history of coffee policies in Uganda, which lead to the foundation of UCDA; 
and finally 3) insights of the trade statistics of Ugandan coffee. Following this approach the 
history of Ugandan coffee will be divided into the three parts mentioned above.  
5.1.1.1 Coffee in Uganda 
Though it is broadly agreed upon by academics that the original coffee plant was native 
to the highlands in Ethiopia, it has also been argued that coffee plants were native to Uganda as 
well. Robusta and Arabica (the two coffee types) plantations were introduced to Uganda by the 
British colonial rulers in 1900 . They were seeking a cheap location for producing coffee for 
Great Britain. During this time commercial coffee farming also took place in Uganda. (Baffes 
2006: 414f) 
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Below there is a map with the areas in Uganda marked that are suitable (brown), less 
suitable (orange) and not suitable (white) for the production of coffee. As one can see that almost 
all parts of the country are more or less suitable for the production of coffee. The area near 
Victoria lake is one of the major coffee production areas in Uganda. 
 
Areas (less) suitable for the production of coffee in Uganda 
 
Figure 3: Areas in Uganda suitable for coffee production (Otto Simonett (1989)) 
 
Up until today, more Robusta is grown in Uganda than Arabica. Ugandan Robusta is 
known in the coffee business as the best Robusta worldwide (Baffes 2006: 424). The beans are 
uncharacteristically hard making them good for roasting processes; additionally the coffee beans 
are grown without the use of fertilizer leading to a special taste which coffee roasters look for 
worldwide (Masiga et. al. 2007: 1). The Ugandan Robusta is perfect for blending and, especially 
interesting for espresso producers, has a special crema (the foam created on every espresso) 
(GAIN 2012: 2). Because many roasters are willing to buy the Robusta produced in Uganda, 
Robusta coffee beans from Uganda catch a high price at the stock markets; rewarding the quality, 
taste and the blend-ability of the Ugandan coffee.  
 
In the last decade the Coffee Wilt Disease (CWD) has affected the Ugandan coffee 
production probably more than the low coffee prices. CWD is a disease that reduces the 
production of coffee trees and can only be fought against by replacing affected trees and soil. 
The Coffee Wilt Disease is assumed to have affected about 40% of the coffee produced in 
Uganda (Masiga et. al. 2007: 16). This leads to a smaller amount of coffee produced in Uganda. 
The coffee market is no longer the primary source of income for the Ugandan government, partly 
because of the fewer coffee bags exported due to the CWD and partly because of a 
diversification of national production in Uganda which was intended by government authorities. 
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Because of these two reasons, one intentional and the other unintentional coffee production has 
stayed stable and has had a huge impact on coffee farmers.  
5.1.1.2 History of governance of the Coffee market 
Coffee has relatively been the major export crop for Uganda for most of the times. Only 
recently have exported goods been diversified (for further details, please see section ‘trade 
statistics’ below). During the times of the International Coffee Agreement (ICA), coffee export 
earnings were one of the main income sources for the Ugandan government (Masiga et. al. 2007: 
6). Although coffee was one of the main income sources for the country, it always relied (and 
still relies) on small coffee farmers with less than 7 acres of land for production (Chiputwa et al. 
2013: 11). Closely related with the ICA was the strictly regulated coffee market in Uganda. 
Coffee had to be sold by the farmers to national agents, which only had the permit to export or 
sell it to other parties. The coffee producers were forced to combine themselves into cooperatives 
and act commonly according to the laws (You and Bolwig 2003: 10). During this time, Uganda 
was ruled by some presidents that were not democratically elected and used this way to enforce 
that profit of the coffee market was directed into the state funds. Resulting in a lack of 
confidence in governmental structure up to today (Hickey 2013: 202). 
 
“The first coffee-related institution, the Coffee Industry Board was 
established in 1930 to address issues of quality control. The Department 
of Crops was set up in 1946 with the main aim of encouraging the 
expansion of robusta coffee. In 1953, the functions of the Industry Board 
were expanded to include price-setting responsibilities and in 1959 (under 
a new name, Coffee Market Board) marketing activities included coffee 
buying. Following the independence in 1962, the Coffee Board assumed 
full control of the robusta industry. In 1969, under the Obote government, 
new legislation gave the Board full responsibility for all aspects of the 
industry, including the monopoly in exports – a structure which remained 
virtually unchanged until 1990, when the sector was subject to policy 
reforms.“ (Baffes 2006: 415) 
 
The beginning of the reforms were already started in the mid-1980s as an International 
Development Association, a fund by the World Bank for poor countries, Agriculture 
Rehabilitation Project was implemented in Uganda. One of the main goals of the project was to 
improve marketing efficiency for farmers, the rehabilitation of processing facilities and to 
support the government in developing sector strategies. Of the $US 70 million dollars funded by 
the project, a whole $US 22 million was allotted to the coffee sector. (Baffes 2006: 415f) 
 
During the 1990’s the coffee market in Uganda was heavily liberalized, leading to many 
eliminations of the strict regulations mentioned above. Coffee farmers were (and still are) 
allowed to sell to anyone willing to buy their coffee, and the obligation for cooperations was 
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abolished as well. The liberalization took place at the same time of the ending of the cold war 
(making the liberalized market economy globally the most favorable system). The abolishing of 
the ICA by many coffee producing countries, and as the paradigm of development support from 
the Western countries shifted towards a liberalization approach. has had an impact on the 
reforms as well. All of these forces led the Ugandan government to the liberalization of many 
sectors in the country, among them the national coffee market (Musumba and Gupta 2011: 219). 
 
Due to liberalization efforts, the Coffee Board was divided into two separate 
organizations in the beginning of 1991; the Coffee Marketing Board Ltd. and the Uganda Coffee 
Development Authority (UCDA). The Coffee Marketing Board with functions in monitoring and 
regulating the industry, withdrew step by step from the industry and after liquidating all of its 
assets, stopped working. This meant an end for governmental involvement in marketing and 
trading activities of coffee, leaving the UCDA as the only public organization in the coffee sector 
in Uganda (Baffes 2006: 416).   
5.1.1.3 Trade Statistics 
 In this section further details on Ugandan trade will be given. First, the exports as a whole 
will be looked at. Hereafter, more information specifically on coffee production is given.  
 
Exported goods by Uganda 1962 - 2010 
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Figure 4: Exported goods by Uganda from 1962 to 2010 (MIT Atlas 2014) 
 
 As one can see in the graph presented above, until recently the main export of Uganda 
was agricultural commodities, mainly coffee. It is also noticeable that Uganda was exporting 
more goods over the years, with two periods in particular where exports declined: 1) 1986 - 1993 
and 2) 1995 - 2001. Furthermore a diversification of the exports started in the 1990’s with fish 
and seafood (blue space); diversification increased further in the 2000’s. This lead to a higher 
export volume in total and at the same time Uganda left dependency on coffee partly behind. 
 
 The next two graphs of exported goods from Uganda give a better impression of this 
trend towards diversification. The left graph shows all goods in percentages in 1990 and the right 
graph shows all exported goods in percentages in 2010.  
 
Exported goods in 1990 (left) and 2010 (right) in Uganda 
 
Figure 5: Exported goody by Uganda 1990 and 2010 (MIT Atlas (2014) 
 
Interestingly one can see that in 1990 coffee amounted to nearly 84% of all exported 
goods in Uganda, followed by other agricultural goods like cotton, raw cow and/or goat skin. 
The picture changed when looking at all exported goods of Uganda in 2010. Here coffee 
amounts to 29% of all exported goods, followed by Gold (11 %), stripped tobacco (~9 %) and 
fish fillets (~8 %). Coffee is still by far the largest exported commodity by Uganda, but the 
reduction from 84% to 29% in 20 years is impressive while at the same time enlarging all 
exports. Though Uganda is still somewhat dependent on foreign earnings in the coffee business, 
the dependency has been reduced. This is supported by Masiga et. al. (2007: 6) who found that 
the income from coffee exports has declined from over 90% in the 1980’s to low as 20% in 
2006. 
 
With coffee being the most exported good from Uganda, an interesting statistic to look at 
is the overall production of green coffee in Uganda because it shows the coffee bean production 
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capacities for a country that depended on the foreign exchange earnings on coffee for a long 
time. Coffee was and still is one of the major export commodities for Uganda.  
 
Figure 6: Green Coffee Production - Uganda - 1961 - 2012 (numbers by FAO, graph by authors) 
 
As one can see in the graph above, the overall production of green coffee has been rather 
stable over the years. Though the liberalization reforms increased the share of the international 
price received by the farmers and could have increased the interest to maximize the overall 
output, the CWD lowered the output of coffee trees or even destroyed them totally. Nevertheless, 
there are two higher production phases with a lower production phase in their middle. The first 
peak of production was hit in 1969 with close to 250,000 tons of green coffee. This was the 
maximum produced for almost 3 decades until it got surpassed by the production output of 1996 
which was almost 300,000 tons.  
 
The first phase was a production growth from 1961 to 1975, followed by a lowering of 
the output of green coffee from 1976 to 1993. From 1994 to 2011 the output of green coffee 
again reached a similar average as the output of the first heightened output phase. Though these 
patterns can be recognized, the overall green coffee production stayed between 150,000 and 
200,000 tons most of the time, with only three peaks (1969, 1996, and 1999) surpassing 200,000 
tons. 
5.1.2 Institutional History 
As mentioned above, the Ugandan coffee market underwent a huge shift in paradigms in 
the 1990’s. Before liberalization took place, strict regulations were the norm. For example, 
coffee farmers were forced to form cooperatives. After the fall of the ICA, liberalization opened 
a whole new range of opportunities for coffee producers. Nevertheless most coffee farmers still 
sell their coffee (green beans) at the farm gate to a person that transports it to the next bigger 
facility or market (Masiga et. al. 2007: 3f; Bategeka et al. 2013: 10). 
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As part of the liberalization that took place, the Ugandan parliament formed the Uganda 
Coffee Development Authority (UCDA) in 1992 with the aim of a smooth transition in the 
coffee sector (Baffes 2006: 416). UCDA was amended in 1994 and started working right away. 
UCDA has great responsibilities in the coffee sector and has also a very diverse field of action. 
The institution is financed by 1% of all coffee exports (Baffes 2006: 418). Therefore UCDA is 
one of the very few sub-Saharan coffee institutions with its own budget as well as one of the few 
that publishes a yearly report and statistics on the coffee  market of its own country (Baffes 
2006: 432).  
 
They are still part of the government and are located under the ministry of agriculture. 
The ministry heads 12 departments divided into the sectors of animal resources; crop resources; 
fishery; and policy, planning and support services. Additionally to these departments there are 
eight semi-autonomous sector agencies: 1) UCDA; 2) Cotton Development Organization; 3) 
Dairy Development Authority; 4) Plan for Modernization of Agriculture; 5) National Agriculture 
Advisory Services; 6) National Agriculture Research Organization (NARO); 7) National Genetic 
Resource Information Centre; and 8) Coordinating Office for the control of Trypanosomiasis in 
Uganda. There are no clear terms on how the Ugandan Ministry of Agriculture is able to control 
and lead these institutions leading to a weak coordination function and weak linkages between 
these different sector agencies and the Ministry of Agriculture (Bategeka 2013: 21f). 
5.2. Modes of practice 
In this part, the modes of practice of UCDA will be explained. This perspective is divided 
into two main points: 1) Aim and strategies and 2) the approaches with which UCDA tries to 
fulfill the aims.  
5.2.1 Aim and Strategies 
The overall vision of UCDA is to make “Uganda a distinguished producer of high value 
coffee” (UCDA 2014a). This can be seen as an aim to make the commodity coffee a 
distinguishable product with attributes added because it originates in a specific country and 
therefore adding more value to it (Locher 2010: 11). 
 
Emphasizing on how to accomplish this vision, UCDA published their mission on their 
web page with the aims, 
 
“ (...) to promote and oversee the development of the entire coffee 
subsector through support to research, propagation of clean 
planting materials, quality assurance, value addition and timely 
provision of market information to stakeholders.” (UCDA 2014a) 
 
The mission goals are the first step towards a more practical approach on the overall vision of 
how Uganda can become a distinguished coffee producer. Going further into detail UCDA points 
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out mission objectives, further explaining on how the mission can be translated into more 
detailed and practical tasks.  
 
 There are five mission objectives pointed out by UCDA. The first one concentrates on the 
monitoring of coffee, including the promotion, improvement and monitoring of it with an 
emphasis on maximizing the foreign exchange earnings and payments to the coffee producers. 
The second objective concerns the quality control of coffee so that all standards, as agreed in 
contracts are met by seller and buyer. Third, the promotion and development of coffee in related 
industries is done via the support and initiation of research and extension arrangements with 
other parties. The fourth objective focuses on the promotion of marketing for coffee as a final 
product and not only as green beans. Finally, with the last objective in mind, UCDA will try to 
promote the local and national coffee consumption, so that coffee becomes a local drink as well. 
5.2.2 Approach 
The approach of UCDA can be put into the broader terms of: a) certification; b) 
organization and monitoring; c) research; d) policies; and e) networking and promotion. All of 
these broader terms are written into more details by the organization itself (UCDA 2014b). This 
can be seen as an outline on how to reach the overall vision and how the mission is put into 
action in everyday business:  
 
a) Certification: UCDA is responsible for the publication of certificates according to the 
grade and quality of the coffee produced in Uganda. This includes the certification of coffee 
which is produced and processed in Uganda. Also affecting the price the coffee catches at the 
market, depending on the quality certification issued for specific coffee. Secondly UCDA is 
responsible for the certification of all coffee exported, in the same terms as mentioned above. 
Therefore UCDA is not only responsible nationally but internationally for the certification of 
Ugandan coffee.  
 
b) Organization and monitoring: Parties that are willing to participate in the Ugandan 
coffee market have to be registered by UCDA in accordance with the guidelines of the Ministry 
and on the advice of the board. Therefore all new organizations and bodies in the Ugandan 
coffee market have to address and be approved by UCDA. Secondly, UCDA monitors the world 
market price and adjusts the national coffee prices on a day-to-day basis. Here UCDA plays a 
very important role in making the global prices more ‘transparent’ and available for the coffee 
producers. Thirdly, UCDA also supervises all coffee sub-sectors in Uganda which include 
related industries. On basis of this supervision and/or monitoring, UCDA advises national policy 
makers. Finally, UCDA organizes trainings for technicians, coffee processors and quality 
controllers. 
 
c) Research: UCDA also conducts research. This includes the collection, distribution and 
publication of data of the coffee sector in Uganda. Especially interesting for researchers is that 
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UCDA is one of the very few sub-Saharan institutions that publish yearly reports including 
statistics based on many of the collected data. Furthermore, UCDA conducts some field research, 
but is encouraged as well to relate to and liaise with the Ministry of Agriculture and any other 
organization in the same research area.  
 
d) Policies: As already mentioned above, UCDA also advises policy makers in Uganda 
on the basis of their activities. As an extra point in their strategy is the reconciliation of the 
coffee sub-sector with the macro politics of the government is mentioned. 
 
e) Networking and promotion: UCDA is responsible for the relation of Uganda with the 
International Coffee Organization (ICO). Additionally UCDA establishes relations with different 
international organizations in the coffee sector and has an aim to promote Ugandan coffee 
worldwide. 
5.3. Impact 
In the following section the impact of the approaches taken by UCDA will be looked at in 
detail. First, a closer look at the quantity of the produced coffee bags will be taken. Second, the 
producer's share on global coffee price is focused on; and thirdly, the poverty rate will be 
described.  
5.3.1 Quantity of coffee bags produced  
As already mentioned above, production rose right after 1991 for a while, though it has 
leveled out over the years. In all the years it has been rather stable at around 150,000 to 200,000 
tons of green coffee. Politics seem to have influenced the overall green coffee production less 
than the coffee wilt disease. The disease threatens coffee plantations in Uganda and could also be 
the reason why production has leveled out and not risen over the years.  
 
Additionally, as one could see in the graph on exported goods, the government pushed 
policies forward to diversify from solely being dependent on coffee exports. This can be seen as 
a benefit by the politics, because the exports have diversified and Uganda is no longer as 
dependent on foreign exchange earnings by the coffee sector as compared to 1990. (Bategeka 
2013: 10) 
5.3.1.1 Possibilities for higher coffee export earnings 
Fair Trade is especially interesting, because different studies show that these forms of 
production are more beneficial for smallholders (Chiputwa et. al. 2013: 17). When the quantity 
of coffee production cannot increase, a focus on quality allows opportunities for higher earnings 
for higher quality coffee. Nevertheless, the Robusta which is produced by Uganda’s coffee 
farmers already enjoys a strong reputation globally. Therefore it is proposed by Masiga et. al. 
(2007), that  
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“further efforts should be put into ensuring that Uganda Robusta continues to 
lead in both quality and price, and that the country increases its output of 
organic and fair trade products to match the global average.” (Masiga et. al. 
2007: 16). 
 
This is supported by You and Bolwig (2003) who estimate that Uganda could potentially raise 
their prices of exported coffee by acquiring organic and Fair Trade certification for their coffee 
from 72% to 489% (You and Bolwig 2004: 8).  
5.3.2 Producer´s share of international coffee price 
In this section, a closer look at the price coffee producers receive is taken. First, a graph 
with the price paid to coffee growers will be explained and afterwards a graph with direct 
changes for the coffee farmers will be analyzed. The two graphs show the differences for coffee 
farmers depending on the international market and national laws.  
 
 
Figure 7: Price to growers Uganda (numbers by ICO, graph by authors) 
 
This Graph shows the development of coffee prices that are paid to coffee growers in 
Uganda in $US per pound from 1990 to 2009. The blue line indicates the price for Robusta and 
the red line indicates the price for Other Milds (such as Arabica). For Robusta prices two peaks 
can be observed: in 1995 the first one reaching 60 cents and the second one in 2008 reaching 70 
cents. In between these two peaks is a low of just above 10 cents in 2001. This shows that the 
international coffee market is somewhat unstable and can break down from a peak (like in 1995) 
to a very low price (like in 2001) in a short amount of time. This is also part of trading an 
agricultural good that is produced all over the world. Prices can vary greatly when natural 
disasters hit one of the larger coffee producers, especially Brazil.  
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Secondly, also the higher prices for Arabicas and other milds is an international 
phenomenon. These coffee types usually reach higher prices because of their better taste and 
limited availability on the market. Nevertheless, as the graph indicates, these two prices correlate 
to some extent, except for in 2005, when other milds were sold for a slightly higher price.  
 
Share of export prices received by producers (%) 
 
Figure 8: Share of export prices received by producers in Uganda (Baffes 2006: 416) 
 
The graph above shows the percentage of export prices coffee producers get from the 
international coffee price as they are indicated by the stock markets in New York and London. 
As one can see, the policy implementation of liberalism in 1991 increased the share of what the 
producer receive. Therefore “by all accounts the reforms have been successful. The producers' 
share of export prices doubled and growers receive payment promptly” (Baffes 2006: 416), 
which shows that the situation changed for the coffee farmers in only a matter of a couple of 
years. 
 
Additionally, the graph shows that with the liberalization reforms in 1991 not only did 
the share received by farmers rise, but it also stabilized on a high level at almost 80%. The years 
prior to liberalization show how the prices were unstable with rising and lowering shares with 
fast changes, such as the years from 1979 (almost 60 %) to 1981 (around 25 percent); a change 
of about 40 percent in the share on export prices received by the coffee producers.  
 
Leading to the conclusion drawn by various studies that “have reported a well-
documented poverty-reduction impact on households in the coffee-growing regions (i.e. 
Deininger and Oikidi 2003)” (Baffes 2006: 418), showing how the situation changed 
recognizably in these years for coffee farmers.  
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5.3.3 Poverty rate 
As poverty reduction is always one of the main goals of institutions engaged in the coffee 
sector, the impact of the policy changes on poverty reduction is included in the project. Below a 
graph with the poverty headcount ratio of the total and rural population in Uganda from 1991 to 
2009 can be seen. The data was collected by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics but is provided by 
the World Bank. The data is explicitly comparable since 1992. The graph displays the 
percentages of the total rural population living below the national poverty line, which is 
calculated in relation to the price paid per food basket as explained in the theory part on poverty.  
 
 
Figure 9: Poverty in Uganda (numbers by World Bank, graph by authors) 
 
The graph shows that poverty of the total Ugandan population (blue line) was reduced 
over the years. The only exception in the downwards trend is the year 2002 where the poverty 
count rose in comparison to the last survey in 2000 by about 5%. Comparing the beginning and 
the ending of the graph one can see that the poverty rate was reduced from 56.2 percent in 1992 
to 24.5 percent in 2009. This is more than a halving of the poverty rate in 17 years.  
 
As coffee is primarily produced in the countryside, additionally the poverty rate of rural 
population in Uganda (red line) is looked at. As one can see in the graph, the poverty rate of the 
rural population developed exactly as the overall poverty of the total population; being halved in 
17 years from 60.3 percent in 1992 to 27.2 percent in 2009. There is little variation in the poverty 
count between the total and rural populations which suggests that most of the poverty is 
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experienced in rural areas in Uganda. Related, it also shows that efforts to reduce poverty in the 
rural areas will greatly affect the overall poverty experienced in Uganda (i.e. it is very reasonable 
to focus on projects to reduce poverty in rural areas). All of these findings are matched with what 
has been described by Oikidi et. al. (2005; as quoted in Masiga et. al. 2007: 6). 
 
6. CASE II: USAID and Private Corporations in Public-Private 
Partnerships (PPPs) 
The second case will describe the Sustaining Partnerships to enhance Rural Enterprise 
and Agribusiness Development (SPREAD) and Partnerships Enhancing Agriculture in Rwanda 
through Linkages (PEARL I & II) programs funded by USAID. These are programs supported 
by public (USAID and Rwandan government) and private institutions (Texas A&M University 
and Starbucks) in partnerships to combine finance, knowledge, technology, and expertise in what 
are called public-private partnerships (PPP’s) (USAID 2006: 4). In Rwanda, USAID worked 
with farmers on numerous agricultural products but with a focus on coffee. With input from 
university researchers and private corporations USAID has helped farmers implement coffee 
washing stations (CWS), trained farmers in coffee tasting techniques to improve coffee quality 
and taste, and introduced farmers to U.S. coffee corporations such as Starbucks.  
6.1. History 
In this section a background will be provided to Rwanda’s coffee sector intertwined 
with their governmental history. Furthermore, trade statistics and an institutional history of 
USAID will be provided with regards to their general aims as well as their specific goals they 
wish to accomplish with Rwandan coffee farmers. 
6.1.1 History of the Particular Coffee Market  
The history of Rwandan coffee will be split into the three following sections: 1) 
General facts about the introduction, type, and areas of growth of coffee in Rwanda; 2) a detailed 
history of the policies affecting coffee growth; and 3) the trade statistics of coffee that show the 
importance of coffee production in the Rwandan contexts.  
6.1.1.1 Coffee in Rwanda 
Coffee cultivation first began in Rwanda when missionaries distributed seeds and 
bushes in 1905 during German colonial rule (Goldstein 2011; Kamola 2007). Coffee exporting 
began a little while afterwards in 1917. By the 1920’s, production quickly, and forcefully, rose as 
colonial powers became threatened by Brazil’s large-scale production projects that began to 
control the coffee sector world-wide (Kamola 2007). With Belgian mandate administrators’ 
backing, Tutsi chiefs demanded peasants (mainly the Hutu population) to uproot edible crops and 
replace them with the Bourbon variety of Coffea Arabica beans, one of the two most popular 
varieties of coffee worldwide (Kamola 2007; Goldstein 2011). Today, 98% of the coffee 
produced in Rwanda is Arabica (NAEB). By the 1950’s coffee production increased 
dramatically in tropical Africa and matched that of Latin America and Indonesia (Kamola 2007; 
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Goldstein 2011), and by the 1970’s, coffee exports made up 80% of Rwanda’s merchandise 
exports (Jaffee, Henson, & Rios 2011: 100).  
6.1.1.2 History of governance of the Coffee market 
The cultivation and exportation of coffee in Rwanda has a politically and socially 
intertwined history that describes well much of their recent history and their society today. When 
German colonists first arrived in Rwanda they found good agricultural conditions and a 
centralized political structure headed by the Rwabugiri kingdom (Kamola 2007: 577). The 
kingdom classified ‘Tutsi’s’ as the cattle-wealthy chiefs and the ‘Hutu’s’ as the rest of the 
population. German and Belgian colonialists classified these distinctions as ‘ethnic’ identities. In 
1933, the colonial state distributed ethnic identity cards for these ‘ethnicities.’ Making it easier 
for the colonial powers to control and extract money from the kingdom. Colonialists provided 
their backing through military support to Tutsi chiefs to force labor onto the Hutu population; in 
return Tutsi chiefs paid their tributes to the colonial state (Kamola 2007: 578). Peasants – which 
were basically made up of Hutus – were forced to work on their chiefs’ coffee plantations and 
pay tribute to them. In 1949, this tribute known traditionally as uberetwaa became law as 
taxation. This led the rural majority to an impoverished condition that would mark the farmers’ 
livelihoods for decades. 
 
Hutu dissatisfaction became nationally and globally recognized and revolts against 
the oppressive Tutsi ruling class led to calls for independence, which was achieved in 1962. At 
around the same time, coffee producers called for regulation of the coffee economy. The U.S. 
government, the U.S. coffee industry, and leading coffee producers – including Rwanda – signed 
the International Coffee Agreement (ICA) and effectively took control of 99% of the world’s 
coffee market through quotas and price controls (Kamola 2007: 580). 
 
The ICA was a bitter-sweet affair for most African countries. While the ICA gave 
them consistent and higher than pre-ICA era prices, on the other hand they were held at with an 
inflexible market when demand increased. In the same year the ICA was signed, then-president 
of Rwanda Grégoire Kayibanda nationalized Trafipro, a coffee cooperative founded by himself 
to support Hutu farmers prior to Rwandan independence. By 1966, Trafipro took charge of 27 
national shops and 70 coffee purchasing points (Pottier 2002: 35). 
 
Favouritism by president Kayibanda towards his native growers to the south led 
farmers of the north to claim corruption on the government. The growing discontent led to 
another regime change as Major-General Juvénal Habyarimana took charge (Kamola 2007: 581). 
Under Habyarimana, economic reforms in order to support the disfavoured northern Hutu 
farmers led to planned liberalism which privatized agriculture (including coffee) and opened the 
economy to international investors and foreign development aid. 
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During the 1970’s and 80’s coffee boom, the Habyarimana government provided 
incentives for farmers to begin growing coffee. Through the marketing board, Rwandex, the 
Rwandan government doubled the purchasing price of coffee from 60 Rwandan Francs (RwF) to 
120 RwF (Verwimp 2003: 172). Furthermore, Habyarimana restricted the use of fertilizers for 
tea and coffee only. As the importance of coffee grew in Rwanda, by 1986 coffee exports 
comprised of 82% of Rwanda’s total income from exports (Eriksson et al. 1996: 4). 
 
However, liberalization under Habyarimana proved to hinder the farmer population 
as wealthy elites steadily bought land from small-scale farmers. By 1991, 43% of the land was 
owned by 16% of landowners and political elites profited most as the rural population switched 
to coffee cultivation. In 1989 the ruriganiza famine further forced coffee cultivation as hundreds 
of the rural population died and tens of thousands seeked refuge elsewhere leaving their land 
behind for elites to buy and convert into coffee fields (Kamola 2007: 583), until the system 
became almost entirely dependent on coffee exports. As long as coffee prices remained high, 
political elites and landowners reaped the benefits of coffee trade. 
 
Global over-production of coffee coupled with the push towards further 
liberalization brewed trouble for the coffee-dependent Rwandans. Between 1986 and 1987, 
coffee sales dropped from 14 billion RwF to 5 billion RwF. In June of 1989, as talks of the ICA 
falling apart increased, producers worldwide became worried and sold-off their reserves in bulks 
dropping the price of coffee from $1.80 per pound to $1.00 per pound and dropped another forty 
cents by July 4
th  
($0.60) when the quota system of the ICA officially ended (Kamola 2007: 584). 
In Rwanda the government had no choice but to drop their buying prices from 125 RwF per kilo 
to 100 RwF. Consequently, farmers began to uproot the coffee trees in exchange for food crops 
as a means of mere survival. The government still tried to maintain high prices for coffee despite 
lower international coffee prices but by 1994, the government accumulated $1 billion in foreign 
debt (Verwimp 2003: 172). Under such conditions with increasing political and social tensions in 
Rwanda, the coffee market fell apart and farmers fell into a recession with little to no help. 
 
By the end of the 90’s, with record-low prices for coffee, Rwandan farmers were 
stuck with a commodity in a struggling market. In order to help with the impoverished farmers, 
USAID teamed with private businesses such as Starbucks and Blue Mountain Coffee Roasters to 
provide farmers with technology and knowledge to grow and process coffee that will yield 
higher values for the same amount of coffee. Details on the strategies and application of those 
strategies will follow below in section 2 (Modes of Practice). Beginning in the new millennia, 
the Rwandan government allowed private businesses to invest on coffee farms throughout the 
land – however possibilities were mainly available to a select few already in advantageous 
positions (e.g. those with access to infrastructure such as roads and CWS).  
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6.1.1.3 Trade Statistics 
This section will aim to show the dependence on coffee Rwanda has come to have 
over time, with particular interest to the late 1980’s leading up to the end of the ICA and going 
past the genocide in 1994, the time frame in the late 1990’s before USAID intervention occurred. 
 
Exported goods by Rwanda 1963 - 2010  
 
Figure 10: Exported goods by Rwanda from 1963 to 2010 (MIT Atlas (2014) 
 
As described in the section above, one can observe the dependence on coffee 
Rwandan grew to have throughout the 70’s and 80’s as policy changes turned towards relying on 
coffee production. In 1986, its peak year, 82% of export values came from coffee (Eriksson et al. 
1996: 4). After 1986, in terms of total value and agricultural value, there begins a decline into the 
90’s marked by the fall of the ICA in 1989 and the Rwandan Genocide in 1994. In the new 
millennia, there is a more diversified exportation of goods with agriculture - and mainly coffee - 
sharing the bulk of the exported value along with gold. 
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Figure 11: Green Coffee Production of Rwanda - 1961 - 2012 (numbers by FAO, graph by authors) 
 
In terms of coffee production, it is again clear to see the influence of the policies 
implemented by those in charge, and the events occurred in Rwanda’s past. There is a steady 
increase of production throughout the 70’s and 80’s as government policies incentivized farmers 
to grow coffee. After a peak production in 1987, with the fall of the ICA on the horizon prices 
began to fall and the incentive for farmers to continue cultivating coffee also fell. However 
through an unsustainable attempt at maintaining coffee production, production was still kept high 
until finally, in 1994, the country stopped to witness its worst event in history. Since then, coffee 
production has been kept at a consistent average where, beginning in the 2000’s, the focus has 
not been on volume but on quality.  
6.1.2 Institutional History   
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) was born on 
November 3rd, 1961, when, under the mandate of former U.S. president John F. Kennedy, the 
Foreign Assistance Act was signed into law. The creation of USAID brought together several 
existing foreign assistance agencies under one organization. Since its beginning in the 1960’s to 
today, USAID continues to work for the same objectives: 
 
“Furthering America's foreign policy interests in expanding democracy and 
free markets while also extending a helping hand to people struggling to make 
a better life, recover from a disaster or striving to live in a free and 
democratic country.” (USAID History 2013) 
 
Throughout the decades, USAID has been part of contemporaneous issues 
addressing topics such as human rights, focusing on on market-based solutions, promoting 
democracy, and all the things that come with it. Since the early 2000’s, with the Iraq and 
Afghanistan wars under-way, the focus of USAID turned towards rebuilding war-torn countries 
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with an eye on promoting democracy while also providing basic services such as health care and 
education.  
  
  Around the same time USAID identified an interesting trend among the 
development arena: “the private sector accounted for more than 80 percent of investment in the 
developing world” (GDA History 2013). To account for this change in development, recognizing 
the change going from public funding towards the private sector, in 2001 USAID created the 
Global Development Alliance (GDA) concept to create partnerships with private sector 
businesses as a new way to implement foreign assistance. To qualify as a GDA, partners are; a) 
required to match USAID provisions on a 1:1 basis; b) expected to bring ideas, technology, 
knowledge and information in countries where USAID is working; and c) available to a number 
of foundations including non-governmental organisations (NGO’s), private businesses, colleges, 
universities, and a number of other groups and individuals interested in sustainable and economic 
growth in developing countries (Public-Private Partnerships 2014). The new “Business Model” 
came to be endorsed by then-USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios and then-Secretary of State 
Colin Powell, under which the objective was to, “align public resources with private capital, 
expertise and networks to deepen development impact.” (GDA History 2013). Today USAID has 
gathered over one billion US dollars with over 3,000 different partners worldwide, including the 
Rwandan government. 
 
  Around the same time USAID started to seek partnerships with the private sector, 
the coffee sector itself was in a vulnerable state and needed much help from the farmer’s 
perspective. To help the ailing farmers in Rwanda, USAID made partnerships with a number of 
private businesses (such as Starbucks and Blue Mountain Coffee Roaster), universities (Texas 
A&M and Michigan State Universities), and various other foundations (Fisher-Thompson 2006; 
Oehmke et al. 2011). These partnerships helped fund projects to turn Rwandan coffee into high-
quality, high-value products that were, in turn, put into the specialty coffee market (Fisher-
Thompson 2006).  
6.2. Modes of Practice 
In this section, the modes of practice will be presented and elaborated upon. The 
aims and strategies of USAID and their partners will be presented in section 6.2.1, followed by 
an explanation of how and by which methods they seek to achieve their aims in section 6.2.2. 
6.2.1 Aims/Strategies   
Due to Rwanda’s limited space and resources (they are among the highest densely 
populated countries in Africa), rather than to seek an increase in quantity of coffee produced, 
focus has rather been put on increasing quality to reach higher-value markets. Rwanda seeked 
production of higher-quality coffee whose specialty coffee prices would remain high even when 
conventional market coffee prices fall (Easterly & Freschi 2010). In order to achieve this, 
USAID has partnered with leading researchers and private businesses to raise Rwanda’s coffee 
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production standards through projects such as PEARL (Partnership for Enhancing Agriculture in 
Rwanda through Linkages) I & II, and SPREAD (Sustaining Partnerships to enhance Rural 
Enterprise and Agribusiness Development). 
 
  In 2002, Rwanda published a National Coffee Strategy with specific goals that 
mirrored those of the aforementioned projects and USAID’s new method of achieving 
development through public-private partnerships. Among them, Rwanda hoped to ensure the 
placement of Coffee Washing Stations (CWS’s) in Rwanda’s top 50 coffee producing districts, 
implement quality control systems, gain access to market information, and learn innovative 
branding activities (Rwanda’s National Coffee Strategies, 2009).  
6.2.2 Approach 
Starting in February 2001, university researchers and USAID joined forces to put 
together the knowledge and financial resources necessary to make the above strategies possible. 
The first project to do so was PEARL I headed by Dr. Timothy Schilling, and supported by 
researchers at Texas A&M and Michigan State Universities (USAID 2006: 4). The priority in 
this project was to introduce a fully washed coffee (FWC) value chain. This would enable coffee 
farmers to sell their coffee into a higher-valued market. To classify coffee as FWC, USAID and 
fellow researchers provided farmers and cooperatives with money to help build or refurbish 
coffee washing stations (CWS’s) (Oehmke et al. 2011: 2). From 2000 to 2010, the number of 
CWS’s increased from 2 from 187. The introduction of a FWC value chain proved successful in 
that the coffee grown under this project was able to participate in a high-quality coffee market. 
The success of PEARL I was followed by PEARL II which again intended to establish a greater 
amount of CWS’s as well as create producer cooperatives.  
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Distribution of CWSs in Rwanda 2010 
 
Figure 12: Distribution of CWSs in Rwanda (Oehmke et al. 2011) 
 
SPREAD (2006-2012) continued to invest in CWS’s but also began knowledge- 
and information-based aid. SPREAD helped cooperatives establish an exporting company, the 
Rwanda Smallholder Specialty Coffee Company (RWASHOSCCO), introduced coffee tasting 
competitions such as the Golden Cup and the Cup of Excellence (the first CoE ever held in 
Africa) (Oehmke et al. 2011: 2), and introduce cupping workshops where experts have taught 
producers how to conduct cupping sessions that have helped producers distinguish the taste of 
their coffee even further (Goldstein 2011; Tobias, Mair, and Barbosa-Leiker 2012). 
 
Finally, USAID has also established financing opportunities by introducing 
Rwandan farmers to U.S. coffee retailers such as Starbucks. Partnerships such as these have 
ensured producers a market to sell to. These partnerships also establish long-term relationships 
that give them the ability to sell quality coffee in sustainable quantities (Fisher-Thompson 2006). 
The partnership has also provided the farmers with coffee expertise and training from Starbucks 
to support their effort in attaining higher-quality coffee (PR News Wire 2006). 
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6.3. Impact  
  In the following sections, the impact of the aforementioned approaches presented 
in the projects funded and contributed by USAID and their partners will be analyzed. Since the 
first project began in 2001, the years between 2000 to as recent as the data available provides 
analyzed to determine the effect of the project and the development on coffee trade and farmers’ 
livelihoods. First, a look at the quantity of bags produced in relation to the amount of higher-
quality coffee produced will be given. Second, the producer’s share of global coffee price will be 
analysed and marked for any difference. Finally, the poverty rate will be observed to examine 
whether the projects have made any impact on the reduction of the poverty rate. 
6.3.1  Quantity of Coffee Bags Produced 
Due to Rwanda’s very limited space, the availability to increase total production of 
the green coffee beans is limited. Rwandan smallholders cannot compete with the massive 
amounts of production and export of other countries such as Brazil. For this reason, with the 
cooperation of the above mentioned parties, the goal of projects in Rwanda such as SPREAD and 
PEARL (I & II) was not to increase production – and therefore exports – but to focus on 
improving production to increase quality and differentiate their beans from other beans sold in 
the conventional market (Oehmke, et al. 2011). Seeking higher quality market’s to sell to thus 
gives producers a chance to acquire higher prices for the same amount of coffee. 
 
 
Figure 13: Total production of green coffee in Rwanda (numbers by ICO; graph by authors) 
  
  As it can be seen in the graph above, efforts to increase green production for 
exportation are not visible. Instead, numbers show inconsistent production yields year-by-year 
without any clear indication of increasing or decreasing production. If anything, production 
seems to have dwindled – 1,407,000 bags produced in the last five years (08/09-12/13) compared 
to 1,605,000 bags produced in the first five years of USAID intervention (00/01-04/05). 
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However these differences are only minimal and cannot be attributed to any particular process, 
less so to the intervention by USAID and their affiliated projects as it was not their intention to 
affect the total quantity of green coffee production. Instead their aim was to increase quality 
through improving coffee bean processing with CWS and identifying special tastes through taste 
tests and competitions. 
6.3.1.1 Possibilities for Higher Coffee Export Earnings 
To see whether USAID’s projects had their intended effect, it would be better to 
look into the possibilities coffee farmers were given with regards to the production process and 
selling of their beans, and the final destination of the exported coffee. These possibilities include 
fully washed coffee (FWC), Cup of Excellence competitions, and getting in contact with 
international corporations that guarantee a specialty market to sell to. This gives Rwandan sellers 
the opportunity to raise their export revenues while working with similar amounts of coffee.  
  
 
Table 3: Growth in the specialty coffee sector in Rwanda (Boudreaux 2010) 
 
The table above provides a good timeline of the effect USAID has had on growth of the 
specialty coffee sector in Rwanda very well. It shows a steady increase in all aspects of 
achieving access to higher quality markets. In the first row, PEARL I and II’s goals of renovating 
and installing new and renovating old CWS’s are visible. From the beginning when the project 
first took place in 2001 to as recent as we can see, there is an increase in CWSs from 1 in 2002 to 
112 in 2009. With regards to PEARL’s primary objectives, the increase in CWSs is achieved. In 
order to be sold in the specialty coffee sector, coffee not only needs to be fully washed but also 
needs to go through a process of taste tests to determine the taste attributes and whether buyers 
are willing to spend more than usual for those particular beans. In the next row there is also a 
clear increase in the amount of specialty coffee exported – from 30 tons at the beginning of the 
project to 3,045 tons where the most recent data was gathered. USAID also had an impact on 
gathering buyers for Rwandan coffee farmers increasing the amount of specialty coffee buyers 
fifteen fold – from 2 to 30 – with corporations such as Starbucks, Green Mountain Coffee, 
Intelligentsia, Thanksgiving, and Counter Culture Coffee buying Rwandan coffee. And finally, 
the most telling statistic, revenues of coffee sold increased consistently, with a small decrease 
between 2006 and 2007, from $US 90,000 dollars to $US 11,600,000 (Boudreaux 2010). 
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USAID intervention on Rwandan coffee was intended to improve quality to reach 
the specialty market. The graph below shows how, especially since 2003, projects implemented 
by USAID have had an impact on replacing low-value coffee and low-value markets to switch 
selling coffee beans of higher quality to sell to high-value markets. 
 
  
Figure 14: Rwanda Coffee Exports by Unit Value of Destination (Easterly & Freschi 2010) 
 
The capacity to fully wash cherries has also significantly improved so that, in 2006, 
average prices gained by Coffee Washing Stations (CWSs) for their coffee translated to a 
premium of 45 cents per lb over the New York C-Price (NAEB). As Oehmke et al. (2011) 
explain, the price premium received by Rwandan farmers was negative relative to the C-Price in 
the 1990’s, equal in 2002, and went up to as much as 68% in 2009, showing that Rwandan coffee 
was earning a premium based on quality.  
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6.3.2 Producer’s Share of International Coffee Price 
 
Price paid to coffee producers - Rwanda 
 
Figure 15: Price paid to coffee producers - Rwanda in US cents per pound (numbers by ICO; graph by authors) 
 
 The graph above shows the data available for the price paid to producer’s per pound of 
green coffee (from 2000 to 2005). There is an upward trend starting from 2002 to 2005, shortly 
after USAID intervened in Rwanda. Unfortunately no data was available after 2005 from the 
International Coffee Organisation (ICO). Additionally, this data is applicable to all producers of 
coffee in Rwanda not only to those affiliated with USAID and its projects. In order to determine 
the impact of USAID’s project, it would be relevant to analyze data gathered from farmers 
affiliated with USAID’s projects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Income differentials between FWC participants and non-participants 
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Table 4: Income differentials between FWC participants and non-participants. (Oehmke et al. (2011)) 
 
Although little to no information was found on the prices paid to producers, besides 
the data gathered above, there is other data that can be analyzed to for the sake of the 
comparative nature of this project. A study done by Oehmke et al. (2011) analyzed the 
difference-in-difference of 808 respondents split between those in the treatment group (a USAID 
funded project such as PEARL or SPREAD) and those in the control group who were not part of 
an intervention. In the 17 study areas, only one area produced a negative result, meaning the 
control group produced a higher income difference from 2000 to 2010 than the treatment group. 
On average, the 17 study areas resulted in a difference-in-difference statistic of 75.36% in favor 
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of the treatment group. This means that the treatment group received, on average, 75.36% higher 
incomes than those in the control group.  
 
6.3.3 Poverty Rate 
A demographic search by Rural Poverty Portal (2010) marked 8,616,068 people 
out of the total population of people living in Rwanda (10,624,005), to be living in rural areas. 
And, out of the rural population, 5,531,515 people live under the poverty line – in this case set at 
US$1.25 a day (Rural Poverty Portal 2010). The poverty issue in Rwanda is obviously a very 
relevant one to discuss as it affects most of the rural population and about half of the total 
population.    
 
 
Figure 16: Poverty head count in % of total population (World Bank and Rural Poverty Portal) 
 
Similar to the section above (3.2), the data gathered for the graph directly above  
corresponds to the whole population of Rwanda. The graph shown above presents an interesting 
visual of the total poverty headcount of Rwanda. It efficiently marks the urgency of the poverty 
issue in Rwanda that is relevant for this section. It also hints at efforts to decrease the poverty 
headcount in Rwanda. Though there are only four years available, there is a general downward 
trend, part of which, though surely not entirely, can be attributed to USAID intervention in the 
coffee sector as it includes so many of the Rwandan population. However to get a better picture 
of the impact of USAID on coffee farmers, there is a graph presented below comparing farmers 
in the treatment group (i.e. included in USAID projects) with those who are not. 
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Headcount poverty rates in 2010 
 
Figure 17: Headcount poverty rates in 2010 (Oehmke et. al. 2011) 
  
The graph above represents data gathered from two groups, a control group and a 
treatment group, following the end of the PEARL II project in 2010. Both the control and the 
treatment group started with the same poverty rate in 2000. Even after controlling for non-
random differences that may have affected poverty rates, including gender, education, household 
size, and access to health and transportation services, Oehmke et al. (2011) found their results to 
be congruent with the empirical analysis of income change and with descriptors of the coffee 
sector. The 17% difference can thus rightly be attributed to USAID-supported projects. The 
study also found the 17% difference between the two groups to be statistically significant at the 
1% level.  
 
7. CASE III : Solino (Ethiopia) 
In this chapter the third and last case will be explained and analyzed. As with the other 
two cases, first a deeper look into the company's history will be taken. Thereafter an overview of 
the aims and approaches is given, explaining what the goals are and how they are approached. 
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These findings were researched via a personal interview by the authors. Finally, the impact of the 
company is looked at.  
7.1. History 
As mentioned above, this part will give a historical description of the case. Therefore a 
broad overview of the Ethiopian coffee market is given, including a short history of coffee in the 
country. Afterwards a more specific look on the company’s history is taken.  
7.1.1 History of the particular coffee market 
 To be able to give a good overview of the history of the Ethiopian coffee sector, this part 
is divided into three smaller parts: 1) the history of coffee in Ethiopia; 2) a broad governmental 
history of the coffee sector and 3) some trade statistics will be shown.  
7.1.1.1 Coffee in Ethiopia 
Ethiopia is globally seen as the origin of the coffee plant. From Ethiopia, coffee made its 
way to the arabic countries and was discovered there by the Europeans. For a very long time, the 
origin of coffee was kept a secret but was eventually discovered by travels. Nevertheless 
Ethiopia always was, and still is, a big coffee producer and exporter. Therefore the countries 
history has been always intertwined with coffee.  
 
Interestingly Ethiopia is one of the very few countries that produce coffee beans and at 
the same time have a very high local consumption as well as a very long coffee tradition with a 
whole culture around coffee. Ethiopia has the highest per capita consumption of coffee in sub-
saharan Africa and among the coffee producing countries Ethiopia is ranked 4th in per capita 
consumption 2013 (Kaffeereport 2013: 44). Only El Salvador, Venezuela, Costa Rica and Brazil 
have a higher per capita consumption while at the same time being coffee producers.  
 
7.1.1.2 History of governance of the Coffee market 
 To start with, it is necessary to say that here the agricultural sector of Ethiopia is looked 
at most because coffee is the major export crop and most rural people are involved in its 
production. In essence, the agricultural sector can almost be seen as the coffee sector. “Coffee is 
produced by 95% of smallholders in Ethiopia” (Bigsten et. al. 2005: 20), showing that the vast 
majority in the countryside are involved in coffee production.   
 
Ethiopian history shows there were some major shifts in power that affected the 
economic policies and therefore the coffee market as well. Until 1974 Haile Selassie ruled the 
country, but was eventually overthrown by Mengistu Haile Mariam who established a military 
dictatorship. For the next 17 years Mengistu was in power and reduced the influence by the old 
elites while at the same time nationalizing many sectors in the country. Ethiopia had struggles 
and conflicts before with Eritrea which persisted. Somalia invaded Ethiopia in 1977 and in the 
1980’s droughts affected the country, peaking in a major famine in 1984. The attempts by the 
dictator to further nationalize main parts of the economy lead to inefficiency. Additionally, high 
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military expenditures and cuttings in foreign aid reduced the overall economic power. In 1991 
Mengistu was overthrown by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front. (Bigsten 
et. al. 2005: 14) 
 
The new government started extensive reforms in the political and economic sphere. Next 
to establishing peace and maintaining it, the government aimed at establishing democracy, 
human rights, decentralization, market economy and stabilizing it (Bigsten et. al. 2005: 15). 
Despite the poor export performance the economy recovered quite well under the new rulers, 
mainly because peace was re-established and also because of the new policies. (Bigsten et. al. 
2005: 17). It is estimated that in 1990 Ethiopia had a 30% lower GDP than it would have had 
with peace (Bigsten et. al. 2005: 14).  
 
The reforms undertaken by the new government were expected to have fewer effects than 
in other African countries due to the highly state controlled economy. Additionally, the strong 
dependency on agriculture and therefore the instability to weather shocks were not in favor of a 
growing economy. Nevertheless, the Ethiopian economy grew steadily the first seven years 
under the new regime. This was mainly due to good weather and the regained peace and 
economic reforms. However much was left undone, for example the conflict with Eritrea 
escalated again into a war in 1999. In 2000 peace agreements were signed but no agreement was 
reached on the position of all boarders (Bigsten et. al. 2005: 17). 
  
 During the war with Eritrea, investments dropped and trade declined, also due to falling 
coffee prices. The coffee prices were on a downward trend globally in the mid 90’s which had 
strong consequences for the Ethiopian coffee producers. From 1998/99 to 2000/01 exports 
earnings from coffee fell by 55%, having a huge negative effect on the overall economy, due to 
the fact that coffee is the major export good. As coffee in Ethiopia is produced almost only by 
smallholders, they were affected the most. Therefore the government reacted and, for example, 
abolished the 6% export tax while other actions were taken, however it was not enough to 
compensate them for their losses. Additionally, Ethiopia was hit by a drought in 2002. This lead 
to a 12% drop in agricultural output in 2002/03 and lowering the GDP by 3%. The war with 
Eritrea had bad effects on the economic activities, but the drought affected the economy 
negatively by a far greater scale than the war, especially considering that the economy in 
Ethiopia is very much dependent on the weather. (Bigsten et. al. 2005: 20) 
 
 In 2002 the government launched the Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction 
Programme as a new strategy to further push Ethiopia towards a market economy. The strategy 
consists of four main pillars:  
 
“1) agricultural development-led market industrialization; 2) reforms of the 
justice system and the civil service; 3) decentralization and empowerment; 
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and 4) capacity building in the private and public sectors.” (Bigsten et. al. 
2005: 20).  
 
The emphasis on the agricultural sector shows that the majority of the (poor) people work in this 
sector.  
7.1.1.3 Trade Statistics 
To give an overall view of the Ethiopian economy, first a brief look is taken of the export 
statistics followed by a close-up on exported goods.  
 
Exported goods by Ethiopia from 1962 to 2010
 
Figure 18: Exported goods by Ethiopia from 1962 to 2010 (MIT Atlas (2014)) 
 
One can see that for most of its history, the bulk of exports by Ethiopia were agricultural 
products (orange), mainly coffee. This period lasted from 1962 to 2005. Agricultural exports 
were only expanded by the exports of leather (green), which can be observed in the graph in the 
bottom. Starting in 2005, the exports of other (agricultural) products took place alongside coffee, 
especially: 1) tropical tree fruits and flowers (light green), 2) soybeans (light brown) and 3) 
mining (dark brown). To have a better overview over the products exported, the next graphs will 
show exported goods at two points, in 1990 and 2010. 
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Exported Goods by Ethiopia 1990 (left) and 2010 (right) 
 
Figure 19: Exported goods by Ethiopia 1990 and 2010 (MIT Atlas (2014)) 
 
Here one can see, that coffee amounted for about 41 % in 1990 and rose to almost 49 
percent in 2010. Therefore coffee was and still is the main export product from Ethiopia, making 
it a very important commodity for the country and its foreign export earnings. One can also 
observe that some products have changed; for example that in 2010 sesame seeds are not listed 
anymore and that other products made their way into the statistics, but that the basic situation has 
not change in 30 years: Ethiopia´s main export product is coffee.  
 
Though coffee is the main export product, Ethiopia is one of the very fey countries that 
have a notable domestic coffee consumption while at the same time producing and exporting 
coffee as mentioned above. Therefore the next statistic will compare the overall coffee 
production with the national consumption of coffee in Ethiopia from 1990 to 2013. 
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Figure 20: Production and local consumption of coffee in Ethiopia 1990- 2013 (numbers by ICO, graph by authors) 
 
As one can see in the graph, the overall trend of production and consumption in Ethiopia 
is upwards. The overall coffee production of bags, measured in thousands (000), has been 
multiplied by 2.5 from 3 million bags in 1990/91 to just little above 8 million bags in 2012/13. 
At the same time the domestic consumption of coffee grew as well, by a factor of about 3.4: as 1 
million bags of coffee were used locally in 1990/91 by 2012/13 already, 3.4 million bags were 
used by the local coffee sector. Nevertheless the growth of both sectors lead to an overall 
reduction of the percentage of coffee consumed locally; while in 1990/91 about 33% of the 
coffee produced were consumed locally in 2012/13 24% were consumed in Ethiopia, leading to a 
percentage reduction of about 10% despite the growth in both numbers. Meaning that far more 
coffee is produced for exports than for national consumption.  
 
 
Figure 21: Green Coffee Production - Ethiopia 1993 - 2012 (numbers by FAO, grah by authors) 
 
This graph shows the overall green coffee production in Ethiopia from 1993 to 2012. One 
can see in the graph that the production of Ethiopia has three phases: 1) stable; 2) lowering; 3) 
new heights. In the first phase, coffee production stayed very stable just above 200,000 tons from 
1993 to 2000. Followed by the phase where the coffee production dropped with an overall low 
with just above 100,000 tons in 2003. The low phase lasted from 2001 to 2005, with production 
reaching the old performance in 2006 to surpass 200,000 tons. In 2010 and 2011 production 
reached almost 400,000 tons, almost doubling the overall green coffee production from the first 
(stable) phase. However in 2012 production dropped back to just under 300,000 tons.  
7.1.2 Institutional History 
 The company Solino was founded in 2008 by the CEO after a trip with a friend to 
Ethiopia.  There he was invited to host a workshop on food management by the GIZ (German 
Society for International Cooperation), a public German institution. The society is directly 
located under the German federal Ministry of Development and Cooperation. During the 
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workshop he realized that it would not be easy to export any crop to Europe especially when the 
aim is that that product should be already processed (like ready made pasta, roasted coffee, etc.). 
Taking into account the more value is added in Ethiopia the more money stays in the country and 
is not made by another actor (Solino interview: 1f). 
7.2. Modes of practice 
In this section the modes of practices by the company will be explained. To do so first an 
explanation of the aims and strategies is given; followed by an overview of the approaches used 
by the company to fulfill the goals.  
 
7.2.1 Aim / Strategies 
 As the CEO mentioned in the interview, first, the aim of the company is to make people 
aware of the value adding process and therefore to educate them in the value chain approach. 
This goal is not only valid for people in Africa but in Europe as well. Meaning that in one hand, 
they teach the people in Ethiopia how to add more value to the products to be able to sell them 
for a higher price and at the same time teach people in Europe (especially Germany, because 
Solino’s coffee is almost entirely sold in Germany) what approach they follow and to encourage 
them choose Solino coffee. (Solino interview: 2f) 
 
 Second, the biggest aim is to create qualified jobs on the Ethiopian labor market. This is 
intertwined with the value adding process. When more value is added in the coffee producing 
country not only farmers but also other nodes will participate in the coffee sector. Nevertheless, 
some jobs are indirectly connected with the coffee sector. For example, Solino also produces all 
the packaging material for the coffee in Ethiopia, leading to jobs in this area, as well as 
designers, printers and packers. Therefore in the end creating not only more jobs in Ethiopia but 
also qualified jobs which can be done by people that have an education, like printer or designer 
(Solino interview: 3). 
 
 Third, making people in the developed world aware of the fact that just sending money to 
African countries will not solve their problems. Meaning that aid alone will not be able to break 
the circle of poverty, but as Solino’s CEO said, “by creating qualified jobs which lead to better 
payments for people” (Solino interview: 3). Therefore people in the developed world should 
support products where value is added in the global south, and therefore indirectly support the 
businesses (ideas) in developing countries. Regarding this topic, the book “Dead Aid” by 
Dambisa Moyo is mentioned on the homepage of Solino.  
 
 Leading to the conclusion that Ethiopians need more opportunities than just being a 
farmer creating qualified jobs in the value adding process and finding buyers in the developed 
world. 
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7.2.2 Approach 
 Following the aims, the company has different approaches to fulfill the aims that were 
pointed out above. After analyzing the coffee market, the CEO of Solino realized that the value 
adding process for coffee starts right after the coffee is picked, or whenever it is sold as green 
beans. Meaning that in this part of the value chain the most value is added to the final product. 
Therefore the focus was laid on the steps from the green bean to the roasted coffee which is sold 
to the customers in the final node (Solino interview: 3). 
 
 Then the different steps were analyzed that were needed for the final product to be sold in 
Europe. Next to the roasting of the coffee, the packaging and printing of the packing were 
important steps that had to be made for the coffee to be able to be sold in Europe. Therefore a 
roasting house was set up first where the coffee could be roasted. Additionally printers and 
packing devices were bought to be able to execute the packing and the final packaging of the 
coffee in Ethiopia on the site.  With these steps taken into account the value adding 
process was expanded in Ethiopia.   
 
 All of these steps would not have been possible if the business as a whole was not 
profitable. This is possible, because the coffee is sold in a niche market, the high price sector, in 
Germany. Because the business is profitable, the company can expand and export more coffee 
while creating more opportunities for people to work (Solino interview: 6f). 
7.3. Impact 
Finally Solino´s impact of the approach will be looked at. Due to the fact that it is a rather 
small company it was very hard to get numbers and statistics for a longer period of time. 
Nevertheless the authors gathered some data in the interview with the CEO regarding the impact 
of the company. This section is divided into three subsections: 1) quantity of the coffee bags 
produced; 2) producer’s share of the international coffee price; and 3) poverty rate.  
7.3.1 Quantity of coffee bags produced 
When Solino started in 2008, about 500 kilograms of roasted and packed coffee were 
delivered to Germany for the consumer market. By 2014 the coffee exported to Germany from 
Ethiopia has expanded to 6 tons every two months in a rather straight line. Amounting to about 
36 tons of roasted coffee that are sent via ships from Ethiopia to Germany (Solino interview: 5). 
7.3.1.1 Possibilities of higher coffee export earnings 
There are some ways to improve the coffee export earnings of a country. One is quality 
improvement of the exported good. This is done in coffee often by applying for Organic or Fair 
Trade labels. Solino explicitly does not use Fair Trade, as the CEO states, “for me this is still 
‘old’ thinking” (Solino interview: 4). Furthermore he says that Fair Trade is done with good 
intentions, however it does not change anything in the system fundamentally. By giving the 
coffee farmers a bit more money no problems are solved. On the homepage one can also find the 
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statement that the certification costs are too expensive and could be used directly for expansion 
of the company or the creation of more local jobs in Ethiopia (Solino interview: 4). 
 
The coffee from Solino is neither labelled Organic nor is any organic coffee used for the 
production of the Solino coffee; the aim is to increase the coffee export earnings for the country. 
Solino tries to achieve this by adding more value to the final product already in Ethiopia and 
therefore raising the export earnings that can be achieved by the coffee processors. Though this 
can only be done after the cherry has been picked; e.g. washing, roasting, processing, packaging 
and so forth, therefore helping to rise export earnings of the country, but not the income of the 
coffee farmers in particular. 
 
7.3.2 Producer´s share of international coffee price 
As the focus of the company is not the coffee farmers, but the value adding process 
afterwards, no special focus is given to the coffee farmers. The green beans are bought locally on 
the Ethiopian coffee stock market in the capital. Nevertheless, if the value adding process is 
looked at, one can see that more value is added in Ethiopia. Regarding Solino´s statistics there is 
about 179% more value added than just selling the green beans to Europe. This does not make 
the coffee producer’s share bigger but the share of the services around roasted coffee is expanded 
by the mentioned 179%. These percentages are added by the roasting, printing and packaging, as 
one can see in the graph below. In the graph some number are calculated in Ethiopian Birr (ETB) 
and together they amount for the sum or total (S/T). 
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Value Addition per 250g bag in Ethiopia by Solino 
 
Table 5: Value adding per 250g bag in Ethiopia by Solino (Solino 2013) 
 
This graph shows the costs of a 250 and 500 gram pack of coffee that is further processed 
in Ethiopia and then sold in Germany. Though the calculation of the numbers is one per 100 
kilograms. Following the argumentation of Solino, there is 179% more value added in Ethiopia if 
the coffee is further processed locally. The percentages can be calculated by taking a closer look 
at the prices. The value adding processes include: 1) washing and cleaning; 2) separating and 
roasting; 3) transportation; 4) packaging; 5) certification from authorities; 6) repair costs; and 7) 
financing (bank). All of the named steps take place in Ethiopia and therefore the value of these 
steps is added in Ethiopia.  
7.3.3 Poverty rate 
First a broad look at the overall poverty rate in Ethiopia will be taken. Here the bigger 
trend will be pointed out. The poverty headcount ratio of the total population will be 
complemented by the poverty rate of the rural population, because coffee is an agricultural good 
and is produced in the countryside. Therefore the area of interest is the rural population. The data 
for the graph was collected by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, provided by 
the World Bank, and explicitly pointing out that the data is comparable since 1995.  
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Poverty Headcount in % of total and rural population - Ethiopia 
 
Figure 22: Poverty in Ethiopia (numbers by World Bank, graph by authors) 
 
The graph above shows the poverty rate in relation to the total population and the rural 
population from 1995 to 2011 in Ethiopia. When looking at both poverty rates, no big difference 
between these two can be noticed. In 1995 the poverty was at 45% for total population, and 47% 
for the rural population. First it dropped relatively slow then faster, to 30% for the total 
population and 33% for the rural population. Meaning that in 16 years the poverty rate was 
reduced by 15% regarding total population and by 14% regarding the rural population.  
 
As Solino is a rather small and young company it is very hard to say anything about 
poverty rate or impacts on the region, city or even neighborhood. Especially considering that 
Solino produces its coffee in the capital of Ethiopia with more than 4 million inhabitants. 
Workers live across the city and not in a certain area, making it even more difficult to assess the 
impact of the company. 
 
What can be said however, is that regarding the workers of the company, poverty is 
reduced because they earn “3 to 10 times more than a coffee farmer” (Solino interview: p. 9). 
Helping these people to be better off, as the CEO repeatedly mentioned, by creating qualified 
jobs for people that have studied or even went to university. Creating opportunities and leading 
by example, that can be seen and maybe even copied by other people. By showing that it is 
possible to create new opportunities for people (Solino interview: p. 9f). 
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8. Case Comparison  
 In this chapter of the project the three presented cases are compared to each other. 
Following the structure of the presentation of each single case, the comparison consists of two 
main themes: 1) modes of practice and 2) impacts. As in the case descriptions as well, these two 
broad topics are divided into subsections; modes of practices are compared in a) their aims and 
strategies and b) approaches to reach these aims. The comparison of the impacts of the different 
cases are divided into a) possibility of higher coffee export earnings, b) producer’s share of the 
international coffee price, and c) the poverty rate.  
8.1. Modes of practice 
 As pointed out above, this section is divided into two sub-sections. In each section the 
three cases will be compared to each other, leading to a part conclusion about the comparison of 
the modes of practices of the three cases.  
8.1.1. Aims & Strategies 
 In this chapter the aims and strategies described in the case sections are compared to each 
other. Similarities between these three cases will be pointed out, but also a focus is laid on the 
differences of aims and strategies. First, similarities and then differences will be described.  
 
 There are several similarities that can be recognized in the case analysis. First, the focus 
of all three cases is on increasing quality or value of the coffee. Second, all cases follow the 
Value Chain approach to some extent with the aim of adding more value; leading to the third 
similar aim; providing a stable and higher income for people employed in the coffee sector.  
 
  Aims Approach 
UCDA Produce high quality coffee Nationally controlled export of 
coffee 
USAID Introduce a FWC value chain Install CWSs; business plan 
development; cupping 
workshops 
Solino Increase production process 
in producing country 
Add nodes along value chain in 
producing country 
Table 6: Aims and Approaches of the cases (by authors) 
 
All three cases share the aim of producing higher quality coffee and/or for the niche 
market. That this is possible because consumers in the developed countries are willing to pay 
more for a specialty coffee, is only explicitly addressed by Solino (further details below).  
 
 Secondly, the three cases follow the value adding approach, whether explicitly stated or 
not. This can be seen in the strategies on how to fulfill their aims. In Uganda UCDA has a 
strategy to not only produce higher quality coffee through control, but also to promote coffee as 
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a final product and to boost local consumption. In Rwanda, quality control is also implemented 
in their strategy, next to gaining access market information and knowledge on branding activities 
through cooperation with private companies. Solino explicitly states their mission as the aim to 
promote more value adding in Ethiopia. All these strategies fit perfectly in the value adding 
process. Through these strategies an increase in the value added in the producing country can be 
achieved. While more value chain links in the producing country are taken, more value is added 
and therefore the export earnings are raised.  
 
  As the last similarity, all cases try to ensure a stable and better income for workers in the 
coffee sector in the producing country. This strategy is pointed out by the different cases as 
follows: 1) UCDA primarily focuses on the coffee sector and its subsectors by controlling and 
promoting activities in these spheres. Additionally, UCDA supervises the activities in these 
sectors and consults policy makers on the macro level. 2) USAID primarily focuses on the 
farmers and helped install coffee washing stations to increase coffee quality. Also, USAID led 
farmers to new possibilities and new markets by introducing them to competitions and 
international corporations. 3) Solino primarily focused on the steps after the cherry has been 
picked, ensuring new and qualified jobs in Ethiopia through the value adding process. Even 
though the focus groups differ, all cases share the aim try to secure their focus group a stable and 
good income.  
 
 This directly leads to the differences. Next to these similarities in the aims and strategies, 
various differences could be also found. Here the differences are presented according to the case 
and not to the topic as done above. First, differences by Solino will be pointed out, followed by 
USAID and finished by UCDA.  
 
 As already pointed out above, only Solino pointed out the need for a functioning niche 
market in the developed countries. When the consumer is not willing to pay more for a specialty 
coffee, the production of high quality coffee would not function for the producers. Additionally, 
as the main aim is to create qualified jobs, the outreach of the project is relatively small; limited 
to the workers at the site. Nevertheless, only Solino points out the need for more qualified jobs in 
the coffee sector.  
 
 USAID is the only example that cooperates with private companies and public 
organisations, as PPPs are organized. The cooperation with the companies leads to input and 
possibilities the other models do not have; for example the direct interaction of farmers with big 
sellers of coffee in the developed countries. Also, the aim of USAID is clearly focused on the 
coffee farmers as a single-project that addresses a specific package of activities.  
 
 Differently, the aim of UCDA is sector-wide and national. The aims and strategies affect 
the whole coffee sector as well as sub sectors. The aim is not only on the coffee farmers, but on 
the whole economic sector of coffee production and processing. The strategies are a lot wider 
58 
than the ones of the other cases. As a public actor, it is reasonable to have a broader strategy as it 
deals with and affects more people.  
8.1.2. Approaches 
Directly following the aims and strategies, are the approaches of how to realize the aims 
and strategies. Here the approaches taken by the different cases will be compared. First, the 
similarities will be pointed out, followed by the differences between the cases. Closing the 
section of comparing the modes of practice with a part-conclusions.  
 
 There were very little common similarities found between the approaches of the different 
cases. This is expected and intentional as it is the purpose of the project to compare the different 
approaches. For this reason, the differences between the cases will be the focus of the analysis in 
the comparison section.  Nevertheless, these three approaches share commonalitites by either of 
the two cases: 1) the cooperation with research institutions by USAID and UCDA; 2) the passing 
of knowledge by USAID and Solino; and 3) the combination of achieving business and 
developmental objectives by USAID and Solino. 
 
 UCDA as well as USAID seek cooperation with research institutions in order to fulfill 
their aims. Both have mentioned this method in their approaches and have made these efforts 
with institutions. UCDA has links to the Ugandan Ministry of Agriculture and its research 
facilities and departments, while at the same time looking for cooperation with third party 
researchers. Especially for finding ways on how to tackle the coffee wilt disease. USAID also 
cooperated with the Rwandan government as well as with researchers from universities in their 
projects; PEARL I & II, and SPREAD. Here USAID mainly worked closely with researchers 
together to fulfill their aims.   
 
 USAID and Solino share in their approaches the method of passing on more knowledge 
to the coffee sector through different ways, but mostly through the cooperation of private 
companies with the coffee sector and farmers in their field of practice. The aim is to pass on 
knowledge about the coffee markets in the north, e.g. what consumers want. As well as passing 
on market knowledge and information. USAID joined forces with retailers such as Starbucks to 
pass on knowledge to the farmers about the coffee market in developed countries. Furthermore, 
USAID has given financial assistance for the opening of an exporting company, Rwanda’s Small 
Holder Specialty Coffee Company (RAWSHOSCCO). Solino on the other hand, directly 
exporting from Ethiopia to Europe, has passed on the knowledge of how to enter the European 
market. Additionally, by roasting and packaging in the producing country, Solino workers in 
Ethiopia receive knowledge of the roasting and packing process for the European market.  
 
USAID and Solino also share their method of mixing business and development into the 
same process. USAID works in combination with different partners who have different 
objectives initially but are joined together under one common goal. Solino achieves this 
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combination under one organization, which is the company itself. This gives their cases a greater 
incentive to succeed as their businesses and their profitability depend on it. Efforts to succeed in 
this manner may be taken more seriously especially for the CEO and larger shareholders who 
have invested time and money into the company and the projects.   
 
However, there are more differences than similarities to be found. This is because the 
approaches are closely related to the aims and strategies and as already pointed out above, the 
aims differ very much on who is in the focus of the selected cases. This is also done intentionally 
as it is the purpose of the project to review different methods towards development. UCDA 
includes the whole sector in its aims, USAID focuses primarily on the coffee farmers, and finally 
Solino aims at enhancing the value adding process in Ethiopia, putting into focus the process 
after the cherry has been picked. Therefore the biggest differences will be pointed out regarding 
the cases and their approaches.  
 
 As the public case, UCDA’s strategies and approaches are aimed at the whole coffee 
sector and their related sub-sectors in Uganda. The approaches relate to the strategies and aims 
are the monitoring and certification processes of the whole sector. Any party that wishes to be 
involved in the coffee sector has to be registered by UCDA. With the certification process, 
UCDA not only fulfills a national but also an international role by ensuring the quality standards 
of Ugandan coffee. Furthermore, UCDA has close links to the policy makers and is therefore 
able to influence or at least consult the policy makers regarding the coffee sector. This gives 
UCDA a good position to represent the coffee sector at a national level. Finally, UCDA keeps 
the network with national and international organizations alive, especially as UCDA is the 
official representative of the Ugandan government at the International Coffee Organization 
(ICO).  
 
 For the Rwandan case in this comparison, USAID focused on creating a fully washed 
coffee value chain. The focus on installing coffee washing stations (CWSs) by USAID is unique 
in this case comparison. USAID and its affiliates had one very specific goal above all outlined in 
their projects. They established these projects with the main purpose of creating CWSs. Once 
this was completed, the project would be deemed successful. The other two cases had more 
broad objectives that aimed at improving the coffee sector as a whole (UCDA) or creating nodes 
in the chain (Solino), but were treated as works in progress rather than as projects to be 
completed one at a time. Furthermore, as already pointed out above, USAID worked together 
with private companies and a number of other partners in order to achieve their goals. They 
introduced the first Cup of Excellence competition in Africa and trained people in the craft of 
cupping. This allowed farmers to attribute special tastes in their coffee and to learn the methods 
with which to achieve them. Another aim of this close relation between USAID, private 
companies, and the farmers is not only the passing on of knowledge, but also the establishment 
of (long-term) relationships between the farmers and the private retailers. This not only benefits 
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the farmer, but also assures the retailer a source of high quality coffee to their like, since the 
retailer also trains the farmers.  
 
 Solino, as mentioned early, focuses on the value adding processes after the cherry has 
been picked. Therefore they have analyzed the major steps between the green coffee, sold at a 
stock market, and the bag sold at a supermarket (which includes roasting and packing). 
Following this thinking, the company set up roasting and grinding facilities, as well as packing 
sites. Additionally, there were printers setup to print and create the packaging material for the 
coffee. After the coffee has been roasted, ground, and packed it is sent to Europe. Here the 
differences to the other cases lies within the aim on these specific steps and on a certain single 
value chain.  
 
Part-conclusion 
 As one can see, all three cases have quite similar aims and basic ideas, but differ in many 
aspects. Mainly, the approaches on how to fulfill the aims best, mark the biggest differences 
between the three cases. Their approaches also differ on the main group they target. Following 
this logic, they worked out all some different strategies how to support ‘their target group’ the 
best.  
 
Interestingly all aim at producing higher quality coffee, that is aimed at being sold at a 
niche market in the developed countries. However, these niche markets have to be established 
and people need to be willing to buy specialty coffee at a higher price. If this is not the case, 
neither of these projects would work and none of the main aims could be fulfilled. Therefore 
great power lies within these niche markets, passing the power to the consumer in the north.  
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8.2. Impact  
 In this section, the impacts of the three cases will be reviewed. Their respective impacts 
will be able to tell the advantages and disadvantages of each approach which will help make an 
assessment of the different kinds of approaches. This, in turn, will help evaluate what is best for 
achieving developmental goals.  
 
 First, the possibilities of higher export earnings will be analyzed within each approach. 
Second, the producer’s share of the global coffee price will compared. Third, the poverty rates 
will be reviewed as a result of the effects of each approach. Despite incongruent data, the 
performances on each attribute will be compared so that they can be assessed relative to each 
other.  
8.2.1. Possibilities of higher coffee export earnings 
 All three cases aimed at increasing export earnings for their respective target groups. 
UCDA had a sector-wide approach that reached coffee production nationally, USAID aimed at 
increasing earnings for farmers specifically those working in their projects, and Solino increased 
export earnings for workers of Solino in Ethiopia. Depending on the target group, the different 
sets of data will be compared to one another relative to impacts they had on their target groups. 
First, when available, some graphs will be compared to give a rough overview followed by a 
closer analysis behind the numbers to give a better impression of their respective performances. 
 
 In the case of UCDA, since it is a broader organization with broader goals, it is more 
difficult to determine the possibilities and identify the farmers they wish to reach. Most of the 
data available show estimates of where and how coffee can increase export earnings. You and 
Bolwig (2003) estimate that if Uganda were to acquire FairTrade or Organic certification, they 
would increase their export earnings by as much as 489% or as little as 79%. Although Uganda 
leads the Robusta coffee market, prices are generally lower for Robusta types in comparison to 
Arabica types of coffee. Possibilities for higher earnings, therefore, are lower in the Ugandan 
case in comparison to the other two cases. Since Uganda mainly produces Robusta type coffee 
and there is little demand in the specialty coffee market for Robusta beans, the undifferentiated 
Robusta beans used for soluble coffees and for blends offers little but to acquire Organic or 
FairTrade certification to receive premiums, as You and Bolwig (2003) suggest.  
 
In the case of USAID’s projects, possibilities to increase export earnings were high for 
their target group (i.e. those with access to CWSs or the infrastructure favorable for CWS 
installations and transport of those beans (Murekezi 2010)). In addition to the CWSs, USAID 
also provided producers with expertise in cupping workshops, knowledge of, and access to the 
coffee market, and opportunities to showcase their coffees in cupping competitions such as the 
Cup of Excellence. All these possibilities have provided farmers with great results, showing 
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increases across the board. In the the study by Boudreaux (2010), possibility increases were 
exemplified by an increase in CWSs from 1 to 112, increases in production of specialty coffee by 
more than 100 times the production before USAID intervention, and 15 times the amount of 
specialty coffee buyers. This all resulted in an increase of export value from US$90,000 dollars 
to US$11,600,000 dollars within the target group. This was only one of many studies which 
showed an increase in export earnings, some of which may overlap (Easterly & Freschi, 2010; 
Oehmke et al. 2011; Goldstein 2011). As they are a developmental agency with requirements to 
fulfill, the data for USAID’s interventions are more attainable making their impact easier to 
assess, however this also makes it harder to compare to the other cases. 
  
 An interesting change in the case of Solino’s attempts to provide higher export earnings 
is that they do not focus on raising quality through handling, certification, or attributing special 
tastes to the coffee. Instead, Solino’s attempts of raising export earnings is through a value chain 
adding approach, adding nodes in the producing country. The focus is thus not farmers but on 
people living in Ethiopia who work in the coffee sector. Possibilities to raise export earnings are 
thus very high, however they also vary greatly as they include different jobs, not only those of 
farmers. In theory, this method would increase export earnings the most in a country especially 
since the most valuable nodes (roasting, packaging, and branding) are added in the country. It 
would be interesting to compare data gathered of such an approach especially one of the same 
magnitude as the projects conducted by USAID. Although no such study or data exists, the 
section below will give more comparable data that is also related to this section and can provide 
a review of the impacts of each of the cases. 
8.2.2. Producer´s share of global coffee price 
 The producer’s share of the global coffee price is the section in which the most data is 
available, thus comparable. This is mainly due to the database provided courtesy of the 
International Coffee Organisation (ICO), but also with due respect the data gathered 
independently by Solino.  
 
 The case of UCDA required data on the national level as they are a public organization 
and are responsible for the entire coffee sector in Uganda. For this reason, data was gathered 
from the ICO in which statistics showed the price’s paid split between countries. The timeframe 
chosen was from 1990, the year before UCDA took charge of the coffee sector, to 2009. The 
graph (presented in section 5.3.2) shows the development of the price paid to producers to be 
highly correlated with the international coffee market price for coffee. This can easily be 
attributed to Uganda’s liberalization reforms in 1991 following the fall of the International 
Coffee Agreement (ICA). Though the shares of export prices remained high and stable following 
liberalization, the prices producers received was highly dependent on the international coffee 
price, in other words, unpredictable and volatile. Following the fall of the ICA, prices paid to 
producer’s did not fall to the record low until the “Coffee Crisis” hit in 2001 where producer’s 
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were paid just above 10 US cents per pound despite having a high percentage share (almost 
70%). 
 
 It would have been interesting to compare the national data of Rwanda with that of 
Uganda, unfortunately data from the ICO was only available in Rwanda until 2005. The six year 
period gathered from Rwanda however also suggests similar processes where the price’s drop 
expectedly during the “Coffee Crisis” in 2001 and begin to rise steadily shortly thereafter. 
Because it is only in the beginning phases of USAID intervention in Rwanda, it is harder to 
assess whether USAID had any effect on the prices paid to producer’s on a national level. 
However one would suspect the power of the international coffee market to be too great on a 
national level for a project that focused on favorable farmers.  
  
By evaluation of the project itself however, it must be noted that USAID has shown 
positive results consistently. In comparison to non-participants in Rwanda, treatment group 
farmers achieved a higher income in 16 out of the 17 study areas and averaged 75.36% higher 
incomes for the treatment between all study areas. The data here only shows the differences of 
income gathered between two points, 2000 and 2010, however a timeline of data gathered year-
by-year would have provided an opportunity to assess whether international coffee market 
processes affected these farmers, treatment and non-participant groups, more than the projects 
conducted by USAID. This would ultimately help determine the influence of international 
market processes and whether policies should be catered towards market solutions (i.e. 
something similar to what they ICA provided).  
 
 This brings us to Solino’s case who have developed a market-based solution for the 
impoverished worker of the south. Though it does not deal with only farmers, as the two other 
cases do, Solino focuses on adding value of the final product in the producing country. By 
adding nodes of the coffee value chain in Ethiopia, Solino is able to greatly increase the share of 
the retail price to the producing country. However it does little to increase the share that goes to 
farmers or growers as is the focus in the other two cases. In terms of percentages, Solino 
published that they add 179% of value that stays in Ethiopia by processing, roasting, and 
packaging the coffee locally, than if they were to sell their coffee and green beans. This figure is 
slightly comparable to the one presented above by USAID but only to say that both presented 
positive results. However it is harder to assess which one most beneficial as they deal with 
different sets of data. 
  
8.2.3. Poverty rate 
In all three cases, the poverty rate has had a general downwards trend at the national 
level. In the Ugandan case, the period from 1992 to as recent as possible was taken into 
consideration because, since 1991, UCDA began working as a public organization in charge of 
the coffee sector, and still does to this day. This period showed the timeframe UCDA had the 
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possibility of affecting the total and rural population, with the best possible data available from 
the World Bank. Since the coffee sector is congruent with the rural population, an effect of the 
poverty rate within the rural population will be seen as an effect of UCDA on the population of 
coffee farmers.  
 
 
Figure 9: Poverty in Uganda (numbers by World Bank, graph by authors) 
 
The beginning of the period of analysis shows a poverty rate of 60.3% among the rural 
population. Taking the data from an average of every three years, there is a general downward 
slope from beginning to end with only a slight increase in the poverty rate between 2000 and 
2002. Though the data and research for this is missing for the case of Uganda, this increase in 
poverty may be attributed to what is known today as the “Coffee Crisis” when prices fell to a 30-
year low in October of 2001 (FairTrade Coffee 2011). Nevertheless, the coffee market prices 
rose again and the poverty rate among the rural population fell to an all-time low 27.2% in 2009, 
cutting the poverty rate by more than half.  
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Figure 16: Poverty head count in % of total population (World Bank and Rural Poverty Portal) 
 
In the case analyzing USAID’s projects in Rwanda, data was more readily available and 
matchable to the target group in question. Only in the case of Rwanda was the data matchable to 
the target group on a one-to-one basis (presented further below). Starting from 2000, the year 
before USAID launched its projects in Rwanda, the total population poverty rate was marked at 
70%. By the end of the second project funded by USAID, PEARL II, the total population 
poverty headcount fell to 44.9%. A decrease by less than half of the population. Less of an effect 
of which is attributed to UCDA. Although this data is of the total population, while USAID’s 
projects dealt with a smaller target group (more details in the discussion), the comparison is 
interesting as they show similar figures in roughly the same timeframe. It would be interesting to 
see the poverty rate in Rwanda shortly after 2001 when the “Coffee Crisis” hit to make an 
assessment of whether there are more influential factors outside the reach of UCDA and USAID. 
Unfortunately, the next available data was in 2006. One would reasonably suspect that if poverty 
rates increased in Rwanda after 2002, the international coffee market has more scope and greater 
influence on coffee farmers and their livelihoods than any project or domestic organization 
would have on the national population. In an increasingly globalized and liberalized economy, 
the influence of the workings of the coffee market would be easy to argue for. 
 
Nevertheless, data has been gathered on farmers participating in USAID’s projects. In a 
study done by Oehmke et al. (2011), they found the participant group to have a 17% greater 
poverty rate decrease in comparison to non-participants. This shows great influence by USAID’s 
projects, however the data is difficult to compare to the other cases as they did not have such 
data available of their direct impact. As a stand-alone however, the effects of USAID on their 
target group is more apparent.  
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Figure 22: Poverty in Ethiopia (numbers by World Bank, graph by authors) 
 
Finally, the case of Solino is yet even harder to make as they are such a small company in 
such a populous country (the highest of the three), which is considerable since the data gathered 
measured the entire rural population. Furthermore, Solino has existed for a short time, since 
2008, which makes it difficult to assess the impact of their company on even their own 
employees. Like in the other two cases, there is also a steady decline on the poverty rate between 
the years measured, from 1995 to 2011. Again, an interesting theme must be mentioned. 
Ethiopia, like the countries in the two other cases, are highly dependent on exports of coffee. If 
the general decline in poverty rates is observed in all three coffee-dependent countries, the 
influence of the international coffee market may be greater than the efforts of local businesses 
and national organizations. Again it would have been interesting to observe the possibility of a 
poverty rate increase after 2002, as it does in the Ugandan case, to gather clues of the influence 
of the international market and the “Coffee Crisis.” Unfortunately there is only data between 
1999, 2004, and 2011. Such data however would help determine the hypothesis that the 
international coffee market is the biggest influence and that which needs to be re-structured if 
development agencies wish to have the greatest influence. The combination of business and 
development by USAID and Solino should be considered a step in the right direction. 
 
Part-conclusion 
Though little comparable data was covered, a review of the approaches of the 
possibilities for higher export earnings revealed the private case (Solino) to have the highest 
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possibilities in financial terms. This may be attributed to the fact that they have the most freedom 
in their company policies and thus have more possibilities to increase export earnings. Although 
the possibilities are there, companies must also be willing to apply these possibilities in the 
south, something which is rarely done. The PPP case provided the most varied possibilities by 
way of their joint funding as well as with input from multiple sources in multiple areas including 
technology, knowledge, and networks. Finally, UCDA provided the least possibilities as they 
work in a broader context and cannot focus on specific projects that only focus on one group. 
The lower chance of increasing their export earnings is also due to the type of coffee they export 
which has less demand and less value in comparison to the Arabica type coffees. 
 
The producer’s share of the international coffee price appears to be highly dependent on 
the international coffee market at a national level. The cases of USAID and Solino however 
provide greater efforts to increase the producers’ price for the farmers that lie within their 
mandate. For this reason, USAID and Solino achieve better results as they focus on avoiding the 
international coffee market and entering into the specialty coffee market. This implicitly suggests 
that only a selected few will be able to benefit from being part of a smaller market while the 
majority will have to accept their fate in producing for big corporations. If one considers 
producers to mean the workers in the south, and not only the growers and farmers, then Solino’s 
case will result in the highest share as almost the entire production of coffee is in Ethiopia, 
meaning Solino add almost the entire value of the coffee in the south (only the retailer in the 
north). Nevertheless, liberalisation in 1990 by the Ugandan government has also produced 
impressive results with regards to the farmers’ share of international coffee prices, staying 
consistently at almost 80%. 
 
Finally, the poverty rates for all three cases were gathered at the national level as well as 
case-wise where appropriate and available. Nationally, all three cases showed a general decline 
in poverty rates among rural and total populations. As such a high percentage of the total 
population were rural and poor in all three cases, both lines of poverty (total and rural) showed 
correlating results. Since all three cases also showed a high dependency on coffee, the statistics 
suggested a negative correlation between poverty rates and international coffee market prices, 
where poverty decreased as coffee prices increased. However data was incomplete so definitive 
conclusions are not possible, however further research is requested. Only the case of USAID 
provided poverty alleviation data specific to their projects. Statistics showed a highly significant 
decline in poverty for participants of the projects in comparison to the control group (respondents 
who were not a part of a USAID funded project). 
 
As a final note the method proposed by USAID to cooperate with multiple parties 
appears to be very beneficial to the end goals. The objectives were also more specific and 
projects were launched in order to achieve these objectives. It was easier to achieve and also 
easier to determine whether these projects had an effect or not. Solino’s method (through entirely 
private approaches) showed the greatest expectations however the lack of statistics made the 
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analysis indeterminable. Furthermore, one has to consider that Solino is an uncommon case in 
the business world and such approaches are rare in the developmental arena.  
9. Discussion 
First, it has to be discussed how data for this project was gathered. Of course, when 
writing about cases, publications by the organisations themselves are looked at. However, 
especially when measuring the impact of their programmes, self-made publications cannot 
always be very reliable and third party analyses have to be included. This was the case, where it 
could be found. There were no third party writings about Solino, therefore an interview was 
conducted and the company’s data were put into the Ethiopian context. The same counts for 
USAID projects, especially for measuring the impact, the provided data has to be trusted. 
 
Additionally, it was hard to find and define attributes for the comparison that were easily 
comparable within all three different cases and spheres. The authors are aware, that some 
attributes for the comparison are not easily comparable, nevertheless, regarding the research 
question and the answers that were found, the authors think that the right attributes for the 
answering of the research question were chosen. Especially, because the focus of this project was 
to point out the differences and similarities in the three approaches undertaken by the three cases, 
the different levels they touch and the different impacts they have. Though it is necessary for a 
more detailed picture of the different attributes to collect primary data.  
 
 This is especially the case for the data gathered for poverty. Depending on the theory 
used by the data collectors, the aims and approaches of the data can differ very much from case 
to case. Here further research would be very helpful to have more coherent, valid, and replicable 
data to underline the findings of this project. Furthermore, additional research would help to 
close a gap in the knowledge of how the actions of the different cases are directly affecting the 
people employed in the coffee sector. Here data is almost not available, for reason that poverty 
research is not only conducted in the coffee sector, but mostly in the rural or sometimes 
agricultural sector. This way, answers by more people than just people in the coffee sector find 
their way into the research results. 
 
 Furthermore, the authors are aware, that there are many more attributes affecting poverty 
in a country. There are for example, as already pointed out above in the Rwandan case, the 
unclear or uncertain rights to land; similar cases have been written about in Uganda. This affects 
the people living and farming on the land more than any policy of poverty reduction or aim for 
improvement of the agricultural sector. If the rights of and access to land are unclear, the people 
are left with the option of having to leave their land once and for all. Therefore, things affecting 
peoples everyday life, like land rights, should be remembered when looked at policy makers or 
NGOs trying to improve people’s livelihoods.  
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 Another thing that could be noticed in all three cases was the aim to deliver coffee for a 
quality niche market in the coffee consuming countries. Here, only Solino pointed out the fact 
that for this niche market to exist, consumers in the north need to be educated. This is a very 
important point, because without the niche market, none of the higher quality coffee could be 
sold in consuming countries. Building up on the fact, that these niche markets have been 
evolving the last years, it is interesting to see, how many strategies and aims already try to enter 
this specific market. The fact that the goals pursued by all three actors are only achievable to the 
existence of this niche market and the will of people to pay more for their specialty coffee has to 
be considered and pointed out. Here, for example, experiences from the wine market could be 
shared with and compared to the coffee market.  
 
Finally, one can question which way the coffee producers and/or the coffee sector is 
supported the most. Without primary data on each case, this question is very hard to answer. 
Nevertheless, as an easier indicator, monetary improvements can be taken as an indicator for 
improvements of people working in the coffee sector. Here the liberalisation around 1990 in 
Uganda improved the overall income of coffee producers noticeably. The PPP case helped 
farmers to improve their beans and to open up a niche market with higher prices. Here, not only 
the monetary output was enlarged, but also cupping methods were introduced, business linkages 
were made, and knowledge about quality control was passed on to the producers and into the 
coffee sector. The Ethiopian case helped to establish a whole production site for coffee beans and 
opened up a niche market in Europe for the coffee; here, the coffee sector itself was in the focus. 
One sees, that the public case had a fast overall impact for the coffee producers, the smaller scale 
cases of PPP and the private company had a smaller-scale impact but were able to pass on 
knowledge as well. Therefore depending on the aims and approaches one or the other can 
support the coffee sector the most. Mostly the different levels need to interact to actually support 
and improve the livelihoods of participants in the coffee sector. 
10 Conclusion 
Looking at the presented cases, one can see that there are many differences, but also 
similarities throughout the project. Coffee being a commodity that is produced by the south and 
consumed in the north also shows the tensions in the trading system. All three cases draw to 
some extent on the global value chain (GVC) analysis and in the end all cases try to add more 
value in the country where the coffee is produced.  This goal is approached very differently by 
the different actors as pointed out and discussed below. All countries share at the same time a 
quite high dependency on coffee production for their foreign exchange earnings and therefore for 
their economy. 
 
These conditions were all well exemplified in the countries of the cases analyzed in this 
project (Uganda, Rwanda, and Ethiopia). Attempts at alleviating the conditions allotted to the 
coffee sector and farmers have reached everywhere from local to international organizations. 
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There were three different types of approaches identified in the three cases, which had similar 
aims of improving the conditions of the coffee sector in the country they were working in and at 
the same time changing the conditions of the poor in the developing countries. This can be done, 
because most rural people in this case studies are poor and at the same time coffee is a widely 
spread crop that almost all smallholders produce. This made it possible to conduct a comparative 
analysis of these three approaches for alleviating poverty and improving producers’ livelihoods. 
Such an analysis reviewing different approaches and assessing them is a relevant one in a time 
where traditional developmental approaches have come under heavy criticisms in recent years.  
 
Interestingly, all three cases share quite similar overall aims: Adding more value to the 
coffee and making the commodity coffee distinguishable by country or even region to gain more 
export earnings on the coffee produced. Even though all three cases share this quite similar 
overall goal for their projects, the approaches and strategies of how to reach them vary strongly 
from one another. This directly relates to the first finding of this project: even though the main 
goal is shared by all three projects, the practical methods of how to reach this goal differed from 
case to case; depending on the main focus group, the outreach the case generated were 
formulated according to their respective sub-goals. 
 
In the countries that are so heavily dependent on coffee, the approaches are catered 
towards changing the coffee sector so as to benefit them. The effects of their approaches were 
analyzed, mainly drawing on the idea of a GVC analysis which was used by the cases 
themselves. Relying on GVC analysis, the review whether the new conditions provided the 
coffee sector with greater incomes and better conditions was undertaken. Specifically, three 
characteristics were reviewed as the measurements of impact: 1) Quantity of coffee bags 
produced (and relatedly possibilities of higher coffee export earnings), 2) producer’s share of 
international coffee price, and 3) poverty rate. The results of these three characteristics helped to 
compare the three cases to assess the possible approach for improving coffee sector’s conditions. 
 
From the comparison section that reviewed all three cases, indeterminate conclusions 
were reached. For the majority of the cases and characteristics reviewed, the influence of the 
international coffee market was greater than first considered and presented interesting questions 
for further research. Especially for the Ugandan case where their nationally assembled data were 
highly congruent with the workings of the international coffee market. Nationally, the data was 
mostly affected by the international coffee market in the two other cases, suggesting a small 
force of impact by the private and public-private partnership approaches on a national scale. 
However upon further inspection, these approaches also presented the greatest results and the 
best possibilities for the farmers and workers under their mandate. Working for foreseeable goals 
and under specific projects showed to have the greatest impact for farmers. Specifically in the 
cases of Solino and USAID, methods of adding value along the chain or adding nodes of 
production along the chain in the producing countries showed the best results, or at least, the best 
possibilities. USAID was able to increase producers’ income through the installation of coffee 
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washing stations and introduction of cupping workshops which helped producers identify key 
tastes buyers seeked. Solino on the other hand moved production processes to the south which 
increased the share of the retail price to the developing country by 179%. However their scope 
was small and when considering the poverty rate in each country, the international coffee price 
and the coffee wilt disease appeared to have a greater impact. However as mentioned before, the 
available data made such conclusions indeterminate. In order to come to such conclusions further 
research is requested; nevertheless our findings suggest that these factors (global market, coffee 
wilt disease, and peace and war) should not be underestimated. Further research will help 
determine the root cause of the poverty, and better descriptions will allow development workers 
to implement better policies and approaches for greater impact. 
 
Finally, as the overall finding of this project in comparing these three cases, one can say 
that there is no one way of supporting the coffee sector the best. Depending on the outreach, 
goals, aims, strategies, and focus group, actions can vary strongly. However, all three cases made 
their tribute for supporting the coffee sector. The three cases show, that even while sharing the 
same goals, many different ways can lead to the set goal. Leading to the overall conclusion, that 
there is not one way of supporting the coffee sector, but all three levels should interact and start 
their support at the same time for a most efficient output. Without the legal aspects and legal 
framework provided by the public institution, no coffee company will start to work in the coffee 
producing country. Without the support of marketing knowledge, knowledge about taste, and 
access to niche market, the coffee produced could not be sold to the high quality niche market in 
the developed countries. 
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12. Appendix  
Solino Coffee Interview 
 
Location: Hamburg 
Date and time: 29.04.2014, 10:00 o´clock 
Interviewer: Richard Stiller 
Interviewee: Felix Ahlers, CEO of Solino Coffee 
 
The interview took place in the headquarters of Frosta, and therefore Solino as well, in Hamburg. We sat 
together on a huge conference table and talked over a cup of coffee about the topics. Firstly, we started 
off with some small talk, then I started recording and going through my questions. The interview in total 
took about 50 minutes. The atmosphere was very nice and more like an informal conversation than like a 
strict interview. Here the semi-structured interview helped as well to create a good atmosphere. 
 
The interview was held in German as both people participating, the interviewer and the interviewee, are 
Germans and for both of them German is their mother-tongue. Following is the transcript of the interview. 
The cursive is Richard Stiller and the answers in normal style are by the CEO. 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Richard: Ja genau, das sind auch schon ein bisschen die ersten zwei Fragen kombiniert.Wie sie 
überhaupt darauf gekommen sind eine Firma im Kaffeesektor aufzumachen, wie es dazu gekommen ist 
und warum genau Äthiopien? 
 
Felix Ahlers: Also, wie gesagt, der Witz war, dass ich eigentlich rein zufällig eine Reise mit einem 
Freund in das Land gemacht hab. Vor Ort hatte ich dann Kontakt mit der GIZ und die haben mich dann 
gefragt ob ich mal für Lebensmittelhändler so ein kleines Seminar machen will und weil ich ja schon da 
war, habe ich das dann auch gemacht. Da kamen verschiedenste Produzenten von Lebensmitteln, aber da 
wurde mich auch schon ziemlich schnell klar, dass man so Standard Lebensmittel nicht einfach mal so 
exportieren kann, sondern, dass muss ja auch irgendwas mit dem Land zu tun haben. Also in Äthiopien 
produzierte Pasta, oder so, das macht nicht so viel Sinn, aber bei dem Kaffee Thema war es natürlich 
interessant, weil es auch ein großer Markt ist und das Land auch Expertise hat. Es gibt ja nicht so viele 
Kaffeeproduzenten, die Kaffee produzieren, die den auch gleichzeitig konsumieren. Wie zum Beispiel 
Kenia, die den gar nicht selber trinken und dadurch haben sie auch gar nicht die Kultur ihn [den Kaffee] 
richtig herzustellen. Das war aber eben in Äthiopien gegeben und es war sehr offensichtlich, dass das 
Thema Wertschöpfung fundamental wichtig ist. Und so kam es dazu … und mir war natürlich auch klar, 
dass andere Leute, die in Europa sind, das nie machen würden. Und alle die im Kaffeegeschäft sind 
immer selbst rösten. Es gibt ja praktisch keinen der Kaffee macht und nicht selbst röstet und damit ist es 
für alle anderen eigentlich gar nicht umzusetzen. Da ich, oder wir als Frosta, völlig unabhängig sind und 
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das halt egal ist, wenn es jemand irgendwann mal machen sollte, dann muss es jemand machen, der es bis 
jetzt noch nicht gemacht hat. Und so kam es dann eigentlich in gang. 
 
Das finde ich total spannend, das mit der ganzen Wertschöpfung, das zu verschieben. Ich bin durch Zufall 
im Perfetto [Supermarkt] darauf gestoßen. Das fand ich dann total spannend, dass es komplett nach 
Äthiopien gebracht wird. 
 
Na klar, das war ja schon das besondere und es war ja auch wichtig, dass man hier entsprechende Kunde 
findet, die dass dann auch mit unterstützen. Sie können das eben auch nur machen, wenn Sie ein gewisses 
Volumen haben. Sie müssen ja immer Container voll kriegen und dafür müssen Sie ein bestimmtes 
Volumen voll bekommen. Daher war es auch wichtig, dass wir hier mit den Händlern arbeiten und die das 
auch [in die Produktpalette] aufnehmen. Und das ist eben gelungen, im kleinen Maßstab und jetzt 
versuchen wir es langsam weiterzuentwickeln. 
 
Und Äthiopien war dann eher durch Zufall und nicht sich weil die Richtlinien im Land geändert haben … 
 
eigentlich nicht, also ich sag mal Äthiopien, weil es einerseits schon ein Land ist, was unheimlich darauf 
angewiesen ist, dass es sich entwickelt und ich meine, es ist immer noch eines der ärmsten Länder, haben 
aber einerseits diesen Vorteil, dass sie richtig guten Kaffee haben und Kaffeekultur haben, also das 
Konw-how haben. Wenn Sie jemanden von null erklären müssen, röste doch mal Kaffee. Ohne Wissen, 
wie es dann mal schmecken soll, dann ist das schon sehr kompliziert. Also das rösten an sich ist ja jetzt 
nicht so kompliziert, aber wenn man dann mal im Detail schaut, kann man eben doch viele Fehler machen 
und das würde jemand, der überhaupt gar kein Verhältnis zum Endprodukt hat, der würde die Fehler noch 
viel öfter machen, als jemand, der schon ein grundsätzliches Verständnis vom Endprodukt hat. So wäre es 
mit vielen anderen Ländern auch nicht gegangen. In Kenia hätte man das so wahrscheinlich gar nicht 
aufziehen können. Zumindest hätte ich es dort nicht gemacht, das wäre schon sehr viel schwieriger 
gewesen. 
 
Was würden Sie denn als primäres Ziel von Solino bezeichnen? 
 
Ziel ist eigentlich, dass wir das Bewusstsein in Europa, aber auch in Äthiopien für dieses Thema 
Wertschöpfung mehr in den Fokus rücken und dass man eigentlich mehr verstehen sollte, was wirklich 
wichtig für Entwicklungsländer ist. Aus meiner Sicht, ist dieses ganze Thema „Helfen“ und schicken wir 
mal ein bisschen Geld dorthin fatal und macht die Länder kaputt; macht auch das Selbstverständnis der 
Länder kaputt. Und das habe ich auch öfters selber erlebt, je älter die Leute in Äthiopien sind und je mehr 
sie noch mit den Hilfszahlungen daran gewöhnt sind, desto hilfloser sind sie eigentlich, desto 
fatalistischer und völlig ohne Selbstverantwortung benehmen sie sich und dagegen die jüngere 
Generation, die das nicht mehr so erlebt hat, weil auch die Hilfeleistungen in den letzten Jahren, bisschen 
reduziert worden sind, denken eben ganz anders. Die sind auch so stolz, dass sie sagen, dass sie selber 
dazu beitragen wollen, dass sie sich entwickeln. Diese Haltung ist ja genau richtig und die muss man auch 
unterstützen und das kann man nur, wenn man Ihnen auch die Möglichkeit gibt was zu machen. Wenn 
ihnen immer noch gesagt wird, dass sie nur Kaffee anbauen können … wie sie zum Beispiel Sie studieren 
gerade und dann sollen sie Kaffee anbauen, aber das wollen sie gar nicht, dann setzten sie sich entweder 
ins Boot gehen unter oder nicht, aber sie werden einfach kein Kaffee Bauer, weil sie dazu keine Lust 
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haben. Da gibt nun mal viele Leute, genau wie hier, die studieren die Lust haben was anderes zu machen, 
und wenn man diesen Leuten keine Chance gibt kann sich das Land per so nicht entwickeln. Ganz 
eindeutig. Deshalb ist es so wichtig, dass es dort qualifizierte Jobs gibt und nicht mal eben ein paar Jobs 
zu schaffen und zu sehen, dass die Leute da nicht mehr hungern. Man muss eben dafür sorgen, dass die 
Leute qualifizierte Arbeit haben, dann kommt das ganze in gang. Dann Bildern sie sich auch 
untereinander aus. Wenn jemand weiß, wie man ein Endprodukt, das man hier verkaufen kann und es 
herstellt, bildet er ja gleich, durch die Herstellung, gleich noch andere aus, die da mitmachen in der 
Arbeitskette. Genau, und das ist eben dieses Verständnis, dass man mehr ins Bewusstsein rückt und 
hoffentlich auch noch ein paar andere Projekte in der Art anstößt, das denke ich bringt was. 
 
Genau, auf der Homepage hatte, oder in dem Text, den sie mir geschickt hatten, hatte mich noch sehr 
überrascht, dass die Einfuhrzölle vor noch nicht lange zeit abgeschafft wurden. 
 
Genau, das ist eben auch das politisch absurde, dass wir selbst ja dazu beigetragen haben die Länder 
abgeschirmt haben und nichts von denen zu kaufen, außer Rohstoffe. Das war unser Ziel, weil wir 
interelligenter weise gesagt haben, die Wertschöpfung liegt hier, hier entstehen die interessanten 
Arbeitsplätze und die Entwicklungsländern können uns dazu die Rohstoffe liefern. Und das haben wir 
selbst so gesteuert, bewusst, und gleichzeitig, oh Gott ist ja schlimm, und schicken dann Geld oder 
Lebensmittel dahin. Das ist ja irgendwie total absurd, wenn man … und da witzige ist, dass das in der 
öffentlichen Diskussion gar nicht so ein Thema ist, das wundert mich immer. Weil es so offensichtlich ist, 
aber es ist gar nicht so bekannt. Wenn sie Leute fragen, die wissen dann so was gar nicht. Total ist total 
komisch. Das hat mich dann auch selbst überrascht, ich habe das ja dann auch erst herausgefunden, und 
dann war eben zum Glück, eben 2008, dass dieser Zoll auf 0 gesetzt wurde, zumindest für die ärmsten 
Länder. Das ist zwar schön, aber auf der anderen Seite sind sie nun 50 Jahre zurück. Weil, was wir nach 
dem Krieg aufgebaut haben, an Know-how und Investitionen … Wenn Sie sich heute einen Kaffeeröster 
anschauen, da rösten 3 Leute vielleicht, das ist alles durch technisiert. Und dadurch haben wir schon so 
einen Vorsprung, dass es schwierig ist, für jemanden in Äthiopien sich damit zu messen, dass ist nicht 
mehr so einfach. Das gute ist, dass es diese Entwicklung gibt, dass mehr traditionell geröstet wird und 
nicht mehr mit den Industrie Methoden und auf der Basis ist Äthiopien dann wieder Wettbewerbsfähig. 
Äthiopien ist in dort, sagen wir mal hoch preis Segment, gibt es eigentlich eine Chance, dass sich ein 
äthiopischer Röster mit einer deutschen Produktion messen kann. Insofern, gibt es die Chance nur in 
diesem kleinen Segment, aber selbst dieses kleine Segment, ist ja auch im Ende recht groß. Wenn davon 
Äthiopien einen kleinen teil schon mal abbekommen würde, wäre das ja schon mal was. Und ich glaube, 
dass wenn das im Bereich Kaffee funktioniert, dann ist das auch ein Zeichen für andere Industrien dort. 
Zum Beispiel für die Lederindustrie dort oder dann gibt’s auch andere Dinge, die sich entwickeln können. 
Das sind, dann immer so positive Beispiele, die Leute auch motivieren auch andere Dinge zu tun. 
 
Kann man da auch schon fast so eine Parallele zu Fair Trade zeiehen. Kaffee war ja eines der ersten 
Produkte im Fair Trade Markt und wenn man sich das mal im nach hinein anschaut, hat es ja auch 
verschiedene Produkte nachgezogen 
 
Ja stimmt, vielleicht. Wobei dieses Fair Trade ist für mich immer noch das alte denken, zahlen wir denen 
mal ein bisschen mehr weil wir sind ja so nett und die sind ja so arm,. Das ist aus meiner Sicht falsch 
gedacht, weil es eben nicht fundamental was ändert. Also man kann schon fast sagen, man subventioniert 
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Leute, die etwas tun, was nicht unbedingt alle tun sollten. Man will ja, Äthiopien muss je genau dafür 
sorgen, dass es weniger Kaffeebauern gibt, oder weniger Bauern gibt. Das es eben mehr Leute gibt, die 
andere Dinge tun. Wenn wir jetzt sagen, wir zahlen denen mehr, damit alle Bauern bleiben, aber das 
wollen sie ja eigentlich genau nicht. Das ist auch nicht die Zukunft für das Land, wenn sie 80% Bauern 
haben. Immer sind sie per so von Dürren und Hungersnöten betroffen. Wenn sie 20% Bauern haben, so 
wie hier, dann ist Ihnen das eigentlich egal, weil es noch tausend andere dinge gibt, die man machen 
kann. Insofern., ist dieses Fair Trade manchmal, es ist sicher gut gemeint, sowieso, aber die frage ist, ob 
es wirklich strukturell wirklich das richtige bewegt, das so ein bisschen die frage. Im Weltspiegel gabs da 
so einen Beitrag, dass hatte ich auch auf dem Blog gepostet 
 
Das war so ein kleines Video? 
 
Ja. 
 
Das hatte ich angeschaut. 
 
Genau, das hat Fair Trade eigentlich recht gut beschrieben. Wir ein Tropfen auf den heißen Stein und das 
bewegt nicht wirklich was. Naja … 
 
Ja. Wenn wir zurück kommen zu den Zielen, wie sind denn die Herangehensweisen von Solino, dass sie 
diese erreichen? 
 
Eigenlicht so, dass man eben daran arbeiten muss, dass die Leute ein Produkt herstellen müssen, was 
stabil hier alle Qualitätsanfoderungen von Europa erfüllt. Das ist eigentlich schon mal das erste Ziel, weil 
es muss ja so sein, dass es 100% funktioniert, dauert extreme lange, auch wenn es einfache Produkte sind, 
sind eben noch viele kleine Details. Das Wäre das erste. Und das ist dann auch eigentlich der große Teil 
meiner Arbeit, die Leute dahin zubringen, dass sie es eben schaffen, dass es reibungslos läuft. Das sie das 
komplett alleine können. Das dachte ich, dass es vielleicht zwei Jahre dauert und da sind wir jetzt im 
sechsten Jahr und das ist gerade mal, dass es vielleicht irgendwann mal fehlerfrei durchläuft, aber es 
passieren immer wieder mal kleine dinge … 
 
… aber, dass ist dann wegen Richtlinien, zum Beispiel von der EU? 
 
Nein, das sind dann eher technische Details. Wie eben vor Ort, dass die Drucker alles so drucken, dass es 
an der Kasse lesbar ist, dass die Leute sagen, dass ist ein bisschen verschmiert, aber das ist egal, 
Hauptsache die Vorderseite ist schön. Das sind Dinge, wo jeder hier weiß, dass sind Dinge die gehen 
nicht, aber dort weiß niemand wofür diese kleinen Striche überhaupt sein sollen. Oder dass eben das 
Datum sauber ist und nicht verschmiert. Dass die Außenkartons so stabil sind, das sie den Transport 
überleben und unversehrt in Deutschland ankommen. So viel Kleinigkeiten, an die man normal gar nicht 
denken würde, aber die eben im Detail doch wichtig sind. Aber das ist eben auch das was Ihnen hilft, dass 
müssen wir halt dann so perfekt lernen. Ich vergleiche das immer mit einer indischen Pasta Fabrik, in der 
ich mal gearbeitet habe, die nach Japan exportiert wurde. Die Japaner sind so super anspruchsvoll, was 
die Qualität angeht , da wird wirklich mit die Packung genommen und, fast schon mit dem Mikroskop 
betrachtet, ob da nicht noch ein ganz kleiner schwarzer Spot ist, den man eventuell gar nicht mit dem 
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bloßen Auge erkennt und das ist dann schon ein Reklamationsgrund. Also das ist schon wirklich … Das 
ist für mich das selber Erlebnis, wenn ich sag, das geht nicht, das ist da nicht sauber und die sagen, wo ist, 
denn das Problem? Das ist genau das gleiche mit dem Level der Perfektion, das man braucht, also sie 
müssen sich eben auf die Kunden einstellen. SO ist das eben. 
 
Das ist dann auch wieder eine Know-how Weihegabe, dass man weiß, was produziert wird und was die 
Leute überhaupt anschauen wollen, dass ist doch wahrscheinlich total unterschiedlich. 
 
Natürlich, klar, das ist ja auch schwierig. Wenn ich in Äthiopien geboren wurde und das Land hier nie 
gesehen habe und nicht weiß, was uns hier wichtig ist, dann weiß ich das eben nicht. Dann denke ich, 
dass ist wahrscheinlich genauso wie bei uns, aber hier sind ganz andere Dinge wichtig und genau das zu 
vermitteln, ohne das Leute das mal live miterlebt haben, ist eben nicht so leicht. Das muss man schon, das 
ist schon schwierig und vor allem auch das Verständnis, dass die Leute das akzeptieren, okay, ich mach 
das mal eben so, obwohl ich das für mich gar nicht nachvollziehen kann, aber ich mach es eben trotzdem. 
Das sind eben die kleine Details, die dann wichtig sind. 
 
Das kann ich mir vorstellen, dass das schwierig ist. (…) Haben sie auch Statistiken, wie viel Kaffee 
verarbeiten oder ob es sich über die Jahre gesteigert hat? 
 
Hab ich jetzt so nicht in der Hand, aber ich kann Ihnen so aus dem Kopf sagen, dass wir jetzt so sind, dass 
wir alle zwei Monate einen Container haben. So ein Container hat ungefähr 6 Tonnen. Das hat 
angefangen, dass die ersten zwei Transporte 500 Kilo waren. Also im ersten Jahr waren das so 1000 Kilo, 
und jetzt sind wir bei 6-8 Tonnen. 36 Tonnen, aber das liegt natürlich daran, wie viele Kunden wir hier 
gewinnen können. Schlussendlich sit das auch ein Thema wie aktiv man das hier verkauft. Man muss 
eben hier auch sehen, wie man in die großen Ketten reinkommt, und das ist eben hier in Deutschland 
nicht so leicht. 
 
Ja ist ja das Kaffeeregal ziemlich umkämpft, oder? 
 
Ja, klar. Das ist eben auch, da muss man sehen, dass man die Einkäufer überzeugt, dass was ganz 
besonderes, was kein andere hat und bei zwei größeren ist mir das eben gelungen. Aber das ist schon sehr 
umkämpft. Das ist nicht ganz einfach. Und es ist trotzdem sehr erstaunlich, und das ist das zweite, es 
muss sich ja auch verkaufen, und da der Kaffee doch relativ teuer ist und wir uns in diesem sinne keine 
Werbung leisten können, muss er sich von alleine verkaufen. Und das funktioniert eben auch nur dann, 
wenn man immer wieder, bisschen PR hat, ein bisschen Presse, dass die Leute das ganze verstehen und es 
sich herumspricht, das ist wichtig dabei. Aber ich bin erstaunt, ich habe gerade mit der Edeka gesprochen 
und die sind selbst erstaunt, wie gut sich der Kaffee verkauft, und das bin ich teilweise auch. Das finde 
ich schön, weil das Produkt am Ende anscheinend schon für sich spricht, denn der Kaffee ist auch einfach 
gut. IN Deutschland wenn sie normalerweise einen Kaffee kaufen, das sind ja immer Mischungen. Sie 
wissen ja meistens gar nicht, was für Mischungen das sind, oft sind das billige Kaffees aus Vietnam oder 
so. Dann schmeckt das doch anders, und auch die Industrieröstungen sind auch nochmal anders. Und es 
gibt mittlerweile eben doch mehr Menschen die sich dafür interessieren und das auch verstehen, dass 
guter Kaff auch besser schmeckt. 
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Aber ein eigenes Café oder so haben Sie nicht 
 
Nein, das wäre auch im Verhältnis das ist soviel Arbeit für so wenig, in einem Café 5 Kilo Kaffee 
verkaufen am Tag, aber das ist wiederum ein Witz. Also ist es eigentlich besser seine zeit dafür zu 
investieren, das man 100 neue Supermärkte kriegt, als dass man ein Kaffee aufmacht, was mega viel 
Arbeit ist, dann vielleicht in dem Standort ganz hübsch aussieht, das sieht dann auch kein anderer, der 
nicht dort ist. Das ist ja doch sehr lokal. Aber, wenn es ein Café gibt, dass daran Interesse hätte, würden 
wird das ja auch gerne unterstützen, aber Problem ist, dass sie im Bereich der Café. Also wenn ich hier 
ein Restaurant beliefere, mit dem Kaffee, dann sieht der Kunde ja nie, was für ein Kaffee das ist. Da muss 
ja auf der Tasse was drauf stehen und irgendein Bezug zum Produkt hergestellt werden. Das ist natürlich 
im Supermarkt viel einfacher, weil ich da die Verpackung hab und da das eigentlich kommunizieren 
kann. Daher haben wir auch einfach weniger Gastronomiekunden, weil es da viel schwieriger ist. Weil es 
da nicht so leicht ist das ganze Thema zu verkaufen. 
 
Das waren die, die ich letztes Jahr in Berlin interviewet hatte, die hatten das so gemacht, dass sie in Café 
hatten und dann die Regale voll mit Kaffee und dann dahinter noch den trömmelröster und so was. 
 
In einem Café? Wo sie dann auch selbst geröstet haben? 
 
Je genau. 
 
Ja, das kann man natürlich machen, aber wie viel können sie dann am Ende verkaufen, dass ist ja auch 
limitiert am ende. Und im Verhältnis, ist es ja dann doch viel Arbeit, naja, deshalb hab ich mich immer 
eher auf das Geschäft mit dem Lebensmittelhandel fokussiert. 
 
Wir sind auch noch für unser Projekt daran interessiert, wie sich die Firma auf die Kaffeebauern 
ausgewirkt hat. 
 
Eigentlich ist, das nicht unser Thema. Wir kaufen unseren Kaffee über die ECX an der ganz normalen 
Kaffeebörse und wir würde das auch gerne direkt von den Bauern kaufen, aber das ist gerade in der 
äthiopischen Organisation nicht so einfach, das so hinzukriegen, aber das ist auch nicht unser Fokus. 
Unser Fokus ist eher so, dass wir sagen, okay, den Kaffee kaufen wir ganz normal, s wie er eben auch 
lokal verkauft und gehandelt wird und wir interessieren uns eben vor allem für den Teil nach der 
Kaffeeernte. Was zwischen Ernte und Verkauf statt findet. Und das ist aus meiner Sicht, eben der 
Bereich, der mehr gefördert werden muss. Weil hier qualifizierte Jobs entstehen und nicht im 
Kaffeeanbau. 
 
Das war das dann auch mit den zahlen, wo sie mit 100 Prozent angefangen haben und dann bis 169 
gegangen sind. 
 
Es gibt so einen Film, „Black Glod Movie“ oder so was … 
 
ja, den hatte ich auch schon gesehen. 
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Das ist absurd, wenn sie so einen kleinen Kaffee in New York für 3 Dollar und davon kommen 5 Cent 
beim Bauern an. Alles andere ist, was interessant ist. Jetzt können sie lange drüber philosophieren, ob sie 
ihm nun 5 oder 6 Cent bezahlen, aber damit ändern sie eigentlich nicht das wesentliche, und das finde ich, 
wird immer so ausgeblendet, als wenn das allerwichtigste die Kaffeebauern sind, aber wenn wir mal ganz 
ehrlich sind, ist es das irrelevanteste oder das was nicht wirklich was verändert und Wert schafft. 
Sondern, das was Wert schafft ist genau das dazwischen. Und genau darum müssen wir uns kümmern. 
Und das finde ich ist recht populistisch, denn alle sagen, ja genau de Kaffeebauern, da müssen wir mal 
schauen, und das ist ja ganz wichtig. Das ist ja auch ganz intuitive, wenn ich jetzt Kaffee trinke, denke ich 
an die Bauern, aber das ist der kleinste teil. Was ja auch irgendwie absurd ist, dass verstehe ich auch total, 
und nicht intuitiv, aber es ist trotzdem facht. Und deshalb ist genau diese Wertschöpfungskette an sich 
auch so wichtig, das man versteht, warum so wenig am Ende bei den Bauern landet, nun ja ist ja schade, 
aber ist nun mal so. Das wird man auch nicht verändern können. Weil die Weltwirtschaft eben so 
funktioniert. Aber es ist ja gut, dass ein paar Leute wie Sie, dass verstanden haben oder verstehen. 
 
Zumindest angefangen sich mit der Materie auseinanderzusetzen und tiefer einzusteigen. Ja 
 
Ich meine ja auch , dass es ja auch nicht so einfach und wenn man sich einmal damit auseinandergesetzt 
hat, ist es ja auch recht einfach. Das meinte ich ja auch in meiner Email, wie kriege ich das jetzt einfach 
und gut an jemanden x-beliebigen, er noch nie was davon gehört hat. Das war auch bei der 
Verpackungsgestaltung ganz wichtig. Und ist ja gut, dass sie es gesehen haben, aber es ist eben nicht so 
leicht. Wie beim ersten Blick, genau das klar wird. Da muss man sich Gedanken machen, weil es kein 
Thema ist, was eben schon bekannt ist. Aber man sieht ja trotzdem auch an unseren Kunden, sie uns auch 
im Onlinebereich kaufen, die sind schon auch öfters wieder kaufen und einige verstehen es auch schon 
komplett, aber das ist eben nur ein Bruchteil. 
 
Ja, da hatten mich die vier Symbole das erste mal angesprochen. 
 
Ja, das war auch so ein bisschen die Intention. 
 
Mit ist das vorher noch nicht untergekommen, dass alles im Produzentenland gemacht wird. Gibt es da 
noch andere Kaffees bei denen das gemacht wird? 
 
Ich hab das mal gehört von einem, bei dem das auch gemacht wird. Wie heißt der nochmal … ehrlich 
gesagt, habe ich geschaut auf deren Seite und irgendwie kann das gar nicht sein. Das sagen die mal recht 
kurz in einem Satz auf deren Homepage und schön groß mit Fotos und so, aber nichts konkretes. Also 
ehrlich gesagt, habe ich bis jetzt noch niemanden getroffen, der das wirklich tatsächlich macht. Es gibt so 
ein Kaffee „Good African Coffee“ oder so, die nach England exportieren, aus Uganda. Ich glaube die 
machen das auch … 
 
Ich glaube, über die hatte ich auch schon mal was in einem Artikel gelesen … 
 
Aber das ist in England. Die machen das auch ernsthaft. Aber das ist auch nur auf England. Es gibt da 
auch noch eine ganz andere sehr interessante Organisation: value added in africa .com. Die sind in Irland 
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und die fokussieren sich auch solche value added Konzepte und die versuchen auch gerade Solino Kaffee 
anzubieten. Aber die haben mich angeschrieben und die arbeiten wohl auch an so Themen. 
 
Genau, dann noch eine andere Frage. Wieder so ein bisschen Statistik und Zahlen. Weil wir uns auch 
dafür interessieren, wie sich das auch die Region oder auf die Gegend ausgewirkt habe. Also explizit 
wollen wir uns die Armutsrate anschauen, ob Sie da irgendwie eine Ahnung haben … 
 
das kann man eigentlich nicht, wie machen das ja in Addis Ababaa, das sind 4 Millionen Leute und da 
kann ich nicht ernsthaft sagen, dass sich die Stadt dadurch verändert hat. Das ist am Ende ja dann doch 
sehr klein. Aber das ist ja schritt für schritt im kleinen. Ich weiß nicht ob ich ihnen das mitgeschickt hatte, 
wir haben auf der neuen Webseite so ein paar Lebensläufe von den Personen gemacht, die dort arbeiten. 
Damit man ad ein bisschen nachvollziehen kann und persönlich sich das anschauen kann. Das ist ja 
eigentlich das was wichtig ist. Das wir da jetzt Millionen von Leute, das ist ja nicht so, das kann man 
eben auch nicht behaupten. Aber wenn man ein paar gute Beispiele setzte, dann sehen die Leute das und 
sehen: aha, das geht, das kann ich auch machen, vielleicht was anderes, aber es funktioniert. 
 
Ja auf die Millionen … ich glaube, wenn man sich … wir wollen im Endeffekt haben wir eine 
Regierungsorganisation, die wir uns in Uganda anschauen und noch in Ruanda USAid und Starbucks. 
Das ist dann eben public, privte-public-partnership und Sie als Firma. Uns deswegen haben wir noch die 
Armutsrate mit rein genommen, aber ich würde das jetzt eher dann auf die Mitarbeiter beziehen … 
 
das müsste man auf die Mitarbeiter beziehen und da ist es so, die grobe Daumenregeln, dass wir etwa. 
Ungefähr, der Lohn, der an die Leute gezahlt wird, liegt so zwischen 1.300 und 4.000 Birr. Das müssen 
sie nun dann durch 24 teilen und, dann sind die bei Euros. Das müssen Sie dann mit einem Arbeiter einem 
Bauern vergleichen, der jetzt in der Landwirtschaft arbeitet, da sind sie ungefähr bei 25 Euro im Monat. 
Das mal 25 .. 450 oder so … Das müssen sie vergleichen: 500 im Vergleich zu 1.300 bis 3.000 Birr. So, 
dass ist eben das 3 bis 5 fache was die Leute in der Wertschöpfung verdienen als im Vergleich zum 
ungelernt Arbeiter. Und das ist eben unsere Möglichkeit. Je mehr Kaffee sie erkaufen, desto mehr Leute, 
die so eingestellt werden können und desto mehr kriegen sie auch dafür. Und das ist schon erheblich. Sie 
sehen ja auch in Afrika ist ja der Trend da, dass es die Leute immer mehr in die Städte zieht, aber sie 
müssen natürlich auch eine Arbeit bekommen. Das ist natürlich nicht so leicht. Und die dann bis zu 3.000 
verdienen, dass sind dann auch Studienabgänger, die ganze operations unter sich haben und die kriegen 
eben auch nur so viel, weil sie studiert haben. Wenn es diese Jobs nicht gäbe, gäbe es auch keine Jobs für 
Studienabgänger. Also deshalb kann man sicherlich sagen, dass die Armutsrate innerhalb der Firma 
geringer ist und dass durch die Firma mehr Leute an qualifizierte Arbeit kommen. Aber dass sich dadurch 
jetzt die Stadt verändert hat, ist natürlich quatsch. Wenn das jetzt in einem kleinen Dorf wäre, würde man 
das sicherlich besser merken, aber es ist nun mal nicht in einem kleinen Dorf. Die Mitarbeiter kommen 
eben auch aus weit verstreut aus der Stadt. 
 
Na klar. Zum Schluss habe ich noch eine, ich würde sagen, kritische Frage. Man könnte ja auch sagen, 
man verlagert das alles in den Süden, weil es ja einfach auch billiger ist. Was würden Sie denn darauf 
antworten? 
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Billiger ist es eben nicht, Sie müssen immer sagen im Vergleich zu was. Billiger im Vergleich zu den 
Standardkaffees, die hier geröstet werden ist es 100% nicht. Weil es hier eben komplett automatisiert und 
daher unabhängig von den Lohnkosten ist. Billiger dort ist es eben, weil die Lohnkosten eben niedriger 
sind für so eine traditionelle Art der Herstellung, da ist es tatsächlich günstiger. Das ist so. Das ist ja auch 
nicht in dem Sinne schlecht. Das ist ja immer so, dass die niedriger entwickelten Länder immer niedrigere 
Lohnniveaus haben und sich dann über die Zeit, gerade durch die Chancen, die sie haben, weil sie ein 
niedrigeres Lohnniveau haben, über die Zeit dem höheren Lohnniveau annähern. Das ist immer der 
Prozess, der dann in Gang kommt. Aber der Prozess kommt eben nur in Gang, wenn sie Arbeit haben. 
Insofern sehe ich das nicht kritisch, sondern das ist einfach ein Fakt. Sonst hätten sie auch nie 
Entwicklungsländer, nehmen wir an dort wäre das Lohnniveau wie hier, dann wäre es auch kein 
Entwicklungsland. Dann hätten sie aber auch keine Chance und sie könnten per so nicht 
wettbewerbsfähig sein. Das ist ja der einzige Vorteil den sie haben, dass sie das niedrigere Lohnniveau 
haben. Insofern, müssen sie auch davon profitieren. 
 
 
 
